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As a result of expansion and acquisition, USAir has experienced major
growth in flight operations. In an effort to accommodate this expansion, a
major construction project, called the Midfield Terminal project, is underway
at USAir's major hub, Greater Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT). The
Midfield Terminal will result in a 60 percent increase in gate capacity for
USAir and lower operating costs due to its location. However, increased
gates infer increased flight frequencies. PIT already operates near capacity
during peak periods and runway expansion has only been discussed. This
paper evaluates the conditions of USAir at PIT with regard to the lack of
landing facilities and gate expansion. There will be a dire need for additional
runway capacity at PIT if USAir is to take advantage of the additional gates
and the cost savings associated with those gates. Suggestions are made to
avoid a critical imbalance of airport facilities.
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Chapter One
Research Approach

Introduction

Current conditions in the airline industry are extremely fluid. As
deregulation has come into effect, airlines have found themselves in a
position of "feast or famine". We have seen the proliferation of acquisitions
and mergers. On the down side, many airlines have also failed as a result of
intense competition brought on by the Deregulation Act of 1978.
The nation's major airlines have experienced an increase in the total
number of daily flights. There has also been a tendency for airlines to utilize
the "hub and spoke" traffic system. Consequently, the majority of the major
airline's flights travel through hub cities. This has had a direct impact on
the operating conditions at these hub airports. It has also affected the
operating factors of the tenant airlines at those hubs.
USAir is based in Washington, DC and has been a leader in the air
travel industry since deregulation. It has consistently increased its market
position to the point where it now operates more flights per day than any
other airline. The acquisition of Piedmont Airlines on August 5, 1989, is a
strong indicator of future growth potential.
USAir operates several large hubs. Pittsburgh serves as the anchor of
this system. The coordination and scheduling of USAir flights to and from
Greater Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), will have a substantial
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impact on the effectiveness and profitability of its future operations.
Maximum efforts must be made to assure adequate runway capacity exists to
handle USAir demand, as well as all the other tenants at PIT.

Statement of the Problem
As USAir continues to grow through acquisition and market
competition, attention must be paid to its ability to profit from expanded
operations. A major factor in its ability to remain competitive and profitable
will be the ability of its hub airports, PIT in particular, to handle increases in
flight frequency.
When the new Midfield Terminal at PIT, which is currently under
construction, opens in late 1992, USAir's gate space will increase by over 60
percent. For USAir's investment in PIT to be worthwhile, immediate use
must be made of these gates. Unfortunately, there may not be adequate
runway capacity to handle any substantial increases in operations over the
current rate. Runway capacity is measured by the the stated number of
operations a given runway combination can accommodate according to the
regulations set forth by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). These
runway capacities may limit the use of Midfield Terminal, resulting in grave
consequences for USAir operations, both at PIT and system wide.

Review of Related Literature
Air travel is increasing at a fierce pace. The total volume of traffic is
expected to double by the year 2000. To compound the problem, there are
only two new airports currently under construction in the entire world. To
handle this imbalance, current airport capacity must be expanded ("And
nowhere to land", 1988).
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PIT was designed and built in the early 1950's. At that time there was
no possible way planners could have foreseen the conditions of today's
market. As the air travel business increased, so did the traffic at PIT.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration's Air Traffic Activity
statistics (1988), passenger enplanements at PIT were well over 8.5 million
in 1988. The FAA is projecting this figure to increase to 15 million
passengers in just over five years. In addition, operations at PIT now
average 1,024 movements per day, far less than the 2,192 movements per day
projected for 2000 ("New airports please", 1988). This is an increase of over
114 percent. These figures only take into consideration the commercial
aspect of the airport which represents 89.3 percent of aircraft movements.
General aviation and military movements account for 8.7 percent and 2
percent respectively (Parrish, 1988).
Just prior to the beginning of the Midfield Terminal project in 1985
PIT consisted of 53 gates of which 33 were occupied by USAir (Blazina,
1986). The initial plans for the Midfield Terminal called for an expansion to
63 modern gates. As a result of revised forecasts by the airlines, the size of
Midfield Terminal had to be increased. The latest revisions call for the
construction of 75 gates, of which USAir will occupy 53. The cost of this
expansion has increased over and above the original price tag of $298
million. The entire expansion project is now at $567 million, and has a
projected completion date of October 1992 (Grata, 1989).
According to Edwin I. Colodny, President and Chairman of the Board
of USAir (1987), the new facility encompasses 900 acres and will provide
USAir with a separate commuter terminal with 25 gates. The main terminal
will be capable of being expanded to 100 gates if needed. The landside
terminal, the airside terminal, and the commuter terminal will be easily
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accessible utihzing a modern people mover system. Also, the new position of
the terminal in relation to the runways and taxiways will save USAir over
$10 million annually because of aircraft routing to and from the terminal.
Colodny also stated that the arrangement worked out between Allegheny
County, the City of Pittsburgh, and the State of Pennsylvania to provide
nearly $130 million dollars, made the deal possible.
The major reason for the expansion at PIT is the incredible surge in
USAir traffic, which can be traced, in part, to the growth of USAir and the
merger with Piedmont Airlines on August 5, 1989. The merger with
Piedmont has more than doubled the size of the USAir fleet, number of
flights per day, and the number of employees (Feldman, 1988). In addition,
USAir officials have explicitly stated that they plan to use its hubs as
jumping-off points for additional flights to the West Coast, Florida, and the
Caribbean (Payne & Power, 1989). According to USAir's 1988 Annual
Report, one of USAir's major strategies for the next five years will be to
expand its east-west route system through development of its existing hub
structure.
In 1989, USAir was responsible for 82 percent of aircraft operations at
PIT. USAir plans to board over 62 million passengers in 1990, more than
any other carrier ("USAir restructuring signals shift to post merger
management", 1989). USAir has indicated it plans to continue its aggressive
growth strategy into the future. The current terminal layout at PIT could
not accommodate any substantial increases in flight frequencies. USAir
expects the Midfield Terminal to increase its capacity at PIT by 50 percent
(Rolfe, 1989). This suggests an increase in operations over and above the
current level when Midfield opens in 1992. Good business sense should
preclude assuming financial responsibility for gates that are not needed.
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USAir has devoted substantial financial resources toward the
completion of the expansion project at PIT. Because of the Residual Cost
Agreement USAir has with the County of Allegheny, USAir shares a portion
of all operating costs associated with the running the airport. According to
Blazina (June 27, 1987), USAir has agreed to pay one third of the first $42
million cost overrun, one half of the second $42 million cost overrun, and two
thirds of the third cost overrun if needed. This represents a major
commitment on the part of USAir, not only to the community but also to its
reaffirmation of PIT as its major hub for operations in the future. This
commitment is also evident in the 30 year lease USAir has signed with PIT.
USAir is gambling that the airport facilities will keep pace with USAir's
demand ("Lease signed for Midfield Terminal", 1988).
As the terminal is expanded to handle the incredible increase in traffic
that is projected, little attention has been given to the runway capacity of the
airport. There are currently four runways at PIT; three parallel east-west
runways and one northwest-southeast crosswind runway. Unfortunately,
there are a finite number of movements per hour these runways are capable
of accommodating. These runways are operating at capacity during peak
traffic times. This has not affected current operations at PIT because of a
decrease in overall traffic activity and a streamlining of the USAir schedule.
Once the Midfield Terminal is complete, operators at PIT expect massive
increases in traffic.
Preliminary considerations are being given to a fourth parallel eastwest runway and an additional northwest-southeast crosswind runway,
which would bring the total number of runways to six ("Pittsburgh in the
year 2000", 1989). However, these ideas are only speculative in nature.
Considering the length of time involved in the planning, design, and
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construction of additional runways, the capacity problem will have already
reached a critically significant level by the time the new airport terminal
opens in 1992. As it is, the congestion problem has already become so severe
that USAir is blaming its recent poor on-time performance figures on the
delay problems at PIT. The delay problems stem from the unavailability of
gates to accommodate incoming flights.
USAir has positioned itself to take advantage of the geographic
location of PIT with respect to its route structure. Great emphasis must be
placed on the conditions at PIT to assure a successful environment for future
operations throughout the company. An imbalance between these two factors
will be counter productive.

Statement of Questions
As the number of gates at PIT expand in 1992 from 53 to 75, the
airlines will need to maximize the use of those gates because they will bear
the financial responsibility, especially USAir. One must ask if there will be
an increase in operations for USAir and its competitors proportional to the
increase in gate space at PIT. If there is an increase in operations, the next
major issue to be addressed will be the runway capacity at PIT. Will there be
adequate capacity to accommodate the increase in operations in 1992? If
there is not adequate runway capacity, what will be the consequences for
USAir and other airlines operating at PIT? Without adequate runway
capacity, what actions must be taken to avoid this critical imbalance.
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Method

Subjects
The first subject of this research is the USAir operation at PIT. For
purposes of this study USAir will include the former Allegheny Airlines, the
recent acquisition of Piedmont Airlines, and Pacific Southwest Airlines.
USAir's parent company, USAir Group, Inc. also owns and operates many
other regional commuter airlines. The inclusion of USAir commuter airlines
will also be pertinent to this study, and will be referred to as USAir Express.
The second subject of this research is the runway capacity at PIT. The
major areas of concern will be the flight frequency, increases in traffic,
allocation of landing clearances, gate availability, and runway capacities.
When referring to air traffic operations at PIT, statistics will include
commercial aviation, general aviation, military aviation and special aviation
such as medical flights, unless otherwise noted. All sources of air traffic
must also be considered because they will contribute to the total number of
aircraft movements and to the operational environment. Attention will be
paid to the need to balance runway capacity with terminal area capacity.

Design
Due to the uniqueness of this study, no one style of research will
properly identify current conditions and predict the future environment.
Therefore, the design of this research is best classified as a combination of
historical research and observational research (a version of a descriptive
study).
With the ever changing conditions in the airline industry an
understanding of an airline's current situation is imperative for projecting
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future circumstances. When coupled with drastic changes in an associated
environmental variable, such as an airport, the consequences may have an
amplified impact. This is the case with USAir and its increase in gate space
as a result of the Midfield Terminal at PIT. As USAir continues to grow and
expand, the position and capabilities of its major hub, PIT, may be
detrimental to continued growth. By closely examining this interaction, the
researcher will identify elements at PIT which may hinder the success of
USAir.
This study involves the evaluation of operational data relating to an
ongoing business entity. Scoring and interpretation will be accomplished by
comparing two sets of data. The first set of data consists of the physical
limitations of the existing facility, current operating characteristics of USAir,
Federal Aviation Regulations, and the budgeting constraints of both USAir
and the local government. The second set of data will consist of figures
projecting the future state of affairs. These figures will highlight
requirements necessary to handle the projected conditions in 1992 and
beyond.
Since this research is historical in nature, it may be necessary to place
greater emphasis on secondary sources. Efforts will be made to limit this
bias by obtaining corroborating evidence where possible to validate data.
There are no variables in this research that are capable of being controlled or
manipulated. All variables in this study exist and vary according to
economic principles and political posturing.

Procedure
While it may be relatively easy to forecast the state of the physical
environment in 1992 due to contractual agreements and long term planning,
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it will be very difficult to estimate the condition of the economy, the airline
industry, and the political environment. For this reason great care will be
taken to utilize the most appropriate forecast as a basis for drawing
conclusions.
Chapter Two will begin with a history of aviation in the Pittsburgh
area. The planning and growth of PIT will be chronicled to highlight major
problems planners have faced in the past. Similar mistakes may be avoided
by understanding the historical significance of past situations. The birth of a
midfield terminal will also be discussed, to include the reasoning and origins
for a new facility. Chapter Two will also include an analysis of USAir's
position at PIT, and the impact of the Deregulation Act of 1978.
Chapter Three will explain the structure of the new terminal, airport
facilities, runway configurations, and several other factors that effect air
operations capacity. This information will be obtained from the Allegheny
Department of Aviation, public domain material, and directly from USAir
officials. USAir's position with regard to these facilities will be discussed.
Chapter Four will cover all aspects that relate to the forecasting of
both passenger traffic and operations growth at PIT. This information will
prove crucial to supporting the basic focus of this research. Several different
methods will be discussed to highlight problems with forecasting techniques.
Historical errors in forecasting will also be discussed.
USAir will be contacted to obtain information relating to its plans for
the hub at PIT. Background information will be collected and analyzed to
explain the growth and present position of the Airline and its need for
additional capacity. Projections of USAir's size will be addressed in relation
to the industry. All information needed to analyze the above will be obtained
from historical public records from private and company sources. Personal

interviews will also be scheduled with USAir management. The primary
focus of these interviews will be to identify problems associated with the
increased gates and lack of additional runway capacity. Attention will be
paid to how these factors will affect the overall operations of USAir.
USAir publications will be utilized in obtaining information with
regard to operating costs. This will include, but not be limited to, annual
reports and 10-K financial reports. Other operating information will be
secured through Federal Government publications that compile operating
statistics which the airlines are required to supply. This data will be
validated by other private organizations that collect similar information.
Chapter Five will cover the runway capacity calculations at PIT.
Different models for calculating airport capacity will be discussed
highlighting their deficiencies. Justification will be given for using the peak
hour capacity model. Projections will be made concerning the level of peak
hour operations at PIT, noting the method used to calculate these figures.
Peak hour operations will be examined under both instrument flight rules
(IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR).
Chapter Six will cover possible methods of accommodating forecasted
demand. Suggestions will be made to arrive at a more timely approach to
solving the imbalance of terminal facilities and runway capacity problem.
Attention will be paid to the financial aspect as well as the operational
deficiency that may result if no action is taken. Various formal programs to
address the current circumstances will also be discussed. Attention will also
be given to the possibility of airline re-regulation.
Finally, Chapter Seven will cover the conclusions and
recommendations of this research. Areas where further research is needed
will be highlighted. Attention will be given to the future of USAir and PIT
relative to the Airline industry.

Analysis and Conclusions Anticipated

Based on the data collected, it is expected that USAir's operations will
continue to increase at a constant rate. Because of the growth in the airline
industry and because of USAir's position within that industry PIT will play a
vital role in USAir's continued success. USAir will continue to escalate its
operations at PIT because of its financial commitment to that facility and
because of PIT's geographic position in relation to the route structure.
Unfortunately, it is expected that PIT will not have adequate runway
capacity, as measured by FAA guidelines, to handle the increase in
operations with the opening of the Midfield Terminal. This increase in
operations will stem directly from the organic growth of USAir and its desire
to utilize the most efficient facilities available. In addition, the Midfield
Terminal will also generate additional activity for USAir's competitors. PIT
can accommodate the current activity level. But that may not be the case in
1992. Also, USAir will experience a decrease in operating costs as a result of
the new facility because of the aircraft routing efficiency of the terminal.
Capitalizing on the terminal location will be incentive enough to use the
airport. As they do so, the number of flights that USAir would like to
schedule into PIT will increase. This will not be possible if the runway
capacity has already been reached.
It is imperative that additional runway capacity be planned and
implemented to coincide with the completion of the new Midfield Terminal
project in October 1992. Without such an expansion, USAir will not be able
to realize the full financial and operational benefits of the new terminal.
This situation will result in a decreasing competitive position for USAir not
only in Pittsburgh, but within the industry as a whole.

Chapter Two
PIT and USAir History

Greater Pittsburgh International Airport

One would have great difficulty making the argument that our society
would be better off without the benefits of air transportation. As a direct
result of aviation, Man has been able to explore new geographic areas,
experience other cultures, and benefit from a more efficient system of
commerce. Air travel can no longer be viewed as only for the rich and
privileged. The average consumer has the ability to use this mode of
transportation. In fact, many argue that air travel is no longer a
convenience, but a necessity. As a result, great attention and effort must be
exerted to comprehend the air transportation system, its direction of growth,
and the elements crucial to its continued success.

The Earlv Years
Allegheny County moved fully into aviation in September 1931 with
the construction of the Allegheny County Municipal Airport (AGC). At that
time it was the nation's first airport to incorporate the use of hard surface
runways. By 1937, AGC was handling 70,000 passengers annually on two
airlines. They were Trans World Airlines (TWA), and Pennsylvania Central
Airlines, which later merged with United ("Gateway to the world's skies,"
1972).

Air travel was becoming more commonplace. Throughout the late
1930's air travel continued to increase. It became evident that AGC would
not be capable of handling any substantial increase in activity under its
current configuration. Several problems presented themselves, the greatest
of which was its location. AGC, which still serves as a reliever for PIT, is
situated in the heart of a congested residential area. But, it would be
impossible to establish a buffered land area to surround the airport, or to
expand in the future if needed.
In 1941, Allegheny County identified the Bell family farm as the site
for airport development. It was located approximately 17 miles west of
Pittsburgh in Moon Township (see Figure 1).
The new facility was designed to accommodate both civil and military
aviation needs. However, Allegheny County and the Federal Government
agreed that, in case of a national emergency, the airfield would be turned
over to the military to use as they saw fit (Ward, 1941).
Two short months after the plans had been finalized for the new
airport, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, thrusting the United States
into World War II. As part of our national defense, the Government saw a
great need to protect the mighty industrial machine of the Pittsburgh area.
Over $5 million was spent by the Federal Government on construction and
grading to form runways for defense of the area ("Civil Aeronautics approves
new Moon Township airport," 1944).
As the war continued, so did the post war plans for the airport.
Allegheny County had made an agreement with the Federal Government to
acquire all the land needed for airport development in return for assuming
control and ownership of the airfield after the war was over. By then the
County had spent $278,000 for land acquisition ("Civil Aeronautics approves
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Figure 1. Airport location.
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new Moon Township airport," 1944). The plans for the postwar airport had
swelled to over $12 million. The new design was intended to be a flexible
layout that would meet all emergencies of the future, both civil and military.
A New Era
As agreed, the facilities at PIT were turned over to Allegheny County
at the conclusion of the war. The construction of the new terminal began
shortly thereafter. However, the $12 million airport had erupted into a $33
million project because of expanded plans to handle consistent traffic growth.
The terminal building alone cost $10 million ("Pittsburgh opens biggest
inland airport," 1952).
The construction of the new airport could not have come at a better
time. Traffic had grown at a steady pace ever since the opening of AGC in
1932. Figure 2 illustrates the growth in passengers at AGC, according to the
Passenger Comparison from the County of Allegheny, Department of Aviation
(1990). In 1951, construction of the landing facilities were coming to a close.
The 1,600 acre airfield was officially opened for business on October 1, 1951.
The new terminal was a massive structure. At that time it was the
largest terminal in the world (Russel, 1951). It was seven stories tall, and
included many observation decks, lounges, dining rooms, a theater, and a 62
room hotel ("New $33 million airport serves Pittsburgh area," 1952). It had
16 gates which could be expanded to 32 when needed. Three runways of
8,000 feet, 6,200 feet, and 5,770 feet were operational (see Figure 3).
Soon after the opening of the airport, complaints about inadequacies
began to appear. According to excerpts of editorials in American Aviation
Magazine as reported in the Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph. December 9,1952,
the planning of the airport was "short-sighted" ("Air magazine, pilot censure
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Figure 2. Historic passenger growth at AGC.

airport," 1952). Complaints about the facility ranged from "lack of runways
to assure delay free travel", to "over-crowded passenger boarding areas".
By 1959, the passenger traffic at PIT was increasing at an annualized
rate of 7.43 percent (Snyder, 1965). It was obvious that additional terminal
capacity was needed if growth continued at its current pace. As a result, a
wing was added on to the eastern side of the terminal. It is commonly
referred to as the East Dock. It increased the capacity of the terminal by 62
percent, and cost $3.1 million ("Airport's $3 million wing ready," 1959).
At the same time, the County announced its plans to begin
construction of a second parallel east-west runway to handle large jet aircraft
(the current 28 right/10 left runway). With this additional runway, the
airport capacity would increase by 60 percent. Completion was scheduled for
late 1962. The runway was 10,500 feet of which 9,500 feet would be paved.
The new runway was necessary because of the need for trans-continental
flights. It was estimated to carry a cost of $12 million ("Airport's $3 million

Figure 3. Initial runway layout at PIT. .
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wing ready," 1959). According to the County Aviation Director in 1960, John
B. Sweeney, passenger traffic had doubled since the airport opened, and will
continue to rise. He placed the value of the airfield at $55 million
(Christopher, 1960).
The growth of PIT continued into mid 1965. Calls for major expansion
were beginning to be heard on a more frequent basis. Between the years of
1953 and 1964 revenues at PIT increased by 230 percent, passengers
handled increased by 120 percent, mail hauled increased 89 percent, and
freight hauled increased 19 percent (Snyder, 1965). As a result, plans were
being readied for a much needed addition in the form of a new wing similar
to the East Dock. The addition would be known as the West Dock, and would
incorporate the airport's first use of modern jetways, which allow aircraft
boarding without having to brave the weather elements. The Airport
Advisory Committee estimated that passengers using the terminal would
amount to at least 4 million by 1970, along with rapid growth in cargo jet
operations (Snyder, 1965).
Towards the end of 1966, urgency in airport expansion was reaching
critical levels. As a result, Allegheny County secured the services of the
Landrum & Brown Consulting Firm to study PIT. They submitted their final
report on September 23,1966, which concluded that the terminal was
outmoded and recommended the County spend between $40 to $50 million
into revitalization by 1980 (Pade, 1966). They also proposed the idea of a
completely new terminal located in the middle of the 3000 acre airfield. The
airlines that operate at the airport were also very vocal. TWA called the
airport "out of step" with needs, and "hopelessly inadequate". Temporary
expansion was made in the form of FIVE new gates on the southern portion
of the terminal.

As part of the Airport Master Plan, nearly $200 million was to be
spent on a new cargo complex and a new terminal which would be located in
the middle of the airfield. The new facilities would be capable of handling 12
million passengers by the year 2000 (Gaitens, 1967). It also called for
increasing the number of gates from the current 25 to 56 by 1980. By 2000,
gates were projected to number 90, with 10 to 12 million estimated
passengers. Cargo capacity would be increased 500 percent by 1980, and
even greater by 2000. At this point, Pittsburgh was ranked 13th in the
nation in passenger traffic.
Several years passed without the County acting on the suggestions
made in the latest Master Plan. But after much delay, the County took a
step towards airport renovation with its approval of the purchase of 6,043
acres. This purchase brought the total airport area to 9,143 acres. This land
was needed to extend the length of the existing runways, and for the
construction of the third parallel east-west runway. The cost of these most
recent improvements were estimated to be around $200 million (Williams,
1969).

Midfield Terminal Emerges
On April 8,1969, Tippetts, Abbitt, McCarthy, and Stratton of New
York and Richardson Gordon & Associates of Pittsburgh (consultants)
submitted the first formal proposal for a six story midfield terminal at PIT
("How Midfield Terminal planning progressed," 1987). They estimated the
project would cost $200 million, which was in line with the County's budget
requirements.
But the County chose instead to delay the project, and opted for
interim measures that were much less expensive but would also increase the
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would be added to the western portion of the terminal. In addition, the
South and East Docks would be extended, parking lots added, and an
international building constructed ("Airport expansion set back three years,"
1971). These improvements would boost the gate capacity to 39.
Construction on the interim phase begin on November 1, 1970 ("Airport work
to begin in November," 1970).
Consistent with the history of the airport expansion, the inability to
coordinate all necessary agencies and interests in the expansion plan led to
more delays and problems. By 1971, the airport expansion and new midfield
terminal were going to be delayed at least another three years. By this time
the project costs had risen to $250 million for the new terminal, runway and
other improvements.
The ultimate objective was to establish a major international gateway
through the $250 million program of airport expansion. The first step was
the construction of the improvements previously mentioned. The
International Building was built at a cost of $1.9 million. Upon completion of
the East, West, and South Docks the gate capacity at PIT was increased from
25 to 38. The total interim project carried a price tag of $16 million and
concentrated on passenger comfort and convenience ("Gateway to the worlds
skies," 1972).
Up to this point in time, Runway 23/5, the southwest-northeast
runway was in operation. But as a result of the new additions to the
terminal, and the short length of the runway, it was phased out (Gentry,
1972). The majority of available capacity came from the operation of the dual
parallel runways.
After the completion of the interim expansion, all parties involved
seemed to accept the conditions at the airport. There was adequate capacity,

21
both in terms of runways and terminal facilities. There was no big push to
initiate the permanent expansion plans beyond their current pace. For that
reason, no major outcry from the public resulted when on December 12, 1976,
the midfield terminal project was halted once again because of the conditions
brought on by the energy crisis ("How Midfield Terminal planning
progressed," 1987).

Recent Growth
As airline deregulation loomed on the horizon and the energy crisis
began to subside, there was again renewed interest in the replacement of the
piecemeal terminal at PIT. On November 9, 1978 the County Commissioners
who control the operation of PIT, unveiled their plan to build a $250 million
midfield terminal that was supposed to take the airport into the 21st century,
but would take ten years to complete ("How Midfield Terminal planning
progressed," 1987). On August 23, 1979, Tasso Katselas Associates were
hired to complete the final designs for the terminal. One and a half years
later, on March 14, 1981, Katselas revealed the first plans for the new
terminal. Unfortunately, the facility had increased in cost to $300 million.
As the result of another consulting firm hired to audit the Katselas plan,
Peat Marwick & Mitchel Consultants, the project was pared down to $289
million and submitted for approval on September 30, 1983.
Prior to 1979, the County had decided to build another parallel
runway. It was designated 28 left/10 right, and was placed into service in
1980. The need for the new runway was spawned by the emergence of
Allegheny Airlines as a major player at PIT. Allegheny Airlines, which was
the predecessor of the modern day giant USAir, projected significant growth.
This growth stemmed directly from the benefits of the Deregulation Act of
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1978. In 1978, Allegheny Airlines commanded a 40 percent share of the
market in Pittsburgh, and was looking to grow even further. As a result of
the increasing size of airlines, and the additional competition that resulted
from deregulation, the airport was in need of additional terminal capacity. In
1980, USAir (which changed its name in October 1979) expanded the
capacity of the terminal by almost 37 percent by constructing the Southeast
Dock. Because of the size of the airline, and the importance of the addition,
the major costs were assumed by USAir.
In 1982, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO)
went on strike. Thousands of controllers lost their jobs, reducing the overall
system capacity. Airlines could not profitably fly their routes because of air
traffic control constraints. As a result, the airlines quickly became weary of
any long term financial and operational commitments (Fotos, 1989). The
Midfield Terminal was again placed on hold. The effects of the PATCO strike
and the shakeout of unprofitable airlines can be seen in Figure 4 which
chronicles the growth in operations at PIT since 1965.
By the mid 1980's, USAir had become the dominant carrier at PIT,
which forced County officials to listen to its demand for improved facilities.
As a result, Allegheny County officials began negotiations with USAir on
June 13,1986 concerning the midfield terminal. These negotiations involved
the airline's contribution to the costs of the project, as well as lease fees and
terms, landing fees, and a host of secondary issues. By March 1987, USAir
and Allegheny County reached agreements on the major points of the
negotiations. Ground breaking ceremonies were held on June 26, 1987 for
the construction of what has officially come to be known as the Midfield
Terminal at PIT.
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Figure 4. Historic operations growth at PIT.
But the troubles were not over for airport officials. As growth in both
flight operations and passengers flowing through the terminal continued, it
was recognized that the facilities could not sustain this level of activity until
the Midfield Terminal was completed in 1992. According to Stephen George,
Allegheny County Director of Aviation at that time, new gates would be
needed by summer, 1988 (Belko, 1987). By this time, the East, West,
Southern, and Southeast Docks had been extended to their limit. Passengers
using the airport had increased from 15.9 million in 1986 to an estimated
17.4 million in 1987, well beyond their forecasts (Belko, 1987). The historic
growth trend in passengers at PIT can be seen from Figure 5, as reported by
Allegheny Department of Aviation.
Fortunately, USAir's activity at PIT decreased for two reasons. First,
the demand for air travel in general flattened out in 1989. Second, according
to John Bronson, director of corporate communications at PIT, USAir fine
tuned its schedule in Pittsburgh following the merger with Piedmont
(Vercellotti, 1990, January 27).
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Figure 5. Historic passenger growth at PIT.

It was impossible for airport planners to foresee the explosive growth
that has been experienced over the past 40 years. The major difficulty that
faced PIT was the lack of flexibility in their facility planning. Fortunately,
adequate land was available for expansion as demand increased. A key to
success in the future will be the accurate forecast of future circumstances in
terms of volume and timing. Decisions involving the airport facility will have
an impact not only on the economic environment of Western Pennsylvania
and those airlines that operate in that market, but will affect the entire
national air transportation system and its ability to adequately handle
demand.

USAir History at PIT

The origins of USAir at PIT can be traced back to the late 1940's. In
1948, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) granted All American Airways (the

forerunner of USAir) the right to fly six passenger routes, the majority of
which either began or ended in Pittsburgh. At that time, All American
Airways main offices were located in Wilmington, Delaware.
Because of the strong regional ties to central Pennsylvania and its most
prominent geographic feature, the Allegheny Mountains, All American
Airways changed its name to Allegheny Airlines, Inc. effective January 1,
1953. By 1961, Allegheny Airlines' base for operations and maintenance at
Washington National was too small to adequately handle its needs.
Pittsburgh was chosen as the new base because of its geographic location
with respect to Allegheny's route structure, as well as the facilities PIT
provided (Lewis and Trimble, 1988). Adequate real estate was available to
construct new structures for Allegheny's use. In addition, PIT had a
relatively new terminal building which was one of the largest in the world.
Further doubt about Pittsburgh being chosen as Allegheny's hub were put to
rest when, in 1966, a new computerized reservation system was installed at
PIT.
In 1978, Allegheny Airlines was listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
and the Congress passed the Deregulation Act of 1978. Allegheny was
positioned to take advantage of new market freedom. It had a strong base in
the northeast and an established hub in Pittsburgh, and a lean, narrow-body
fleet.
Shortly after deregulation Allegheny had become one of the nations
largest air carriers. Unfortunately, it was still perceived as being a small
local service airline. Allegheny could not shake this image without changing
its name, which had strong regional connotations. On October 28, 1979,
Allegheny Airlines changed its name to USAir. It was believed that this
name would exhibit the extent of its route structure, in addition to invoking

feelings of national pride (Lewis and Trimble, 1988).
In 1982, the development of USAir was further enhanced by the
completion of a building program at PIT, which included new overhaul
facilities, construction of the Southeast Dock, and a new flight training
facility which totaled $70 million.
On February 1, 1983, USAir Group, Inc. was formed, which is a holding
company established to oversee the operation of USAir as well as many other
small commuter airlines. In 1984, more than 40 percent of USAir's flights
either originated or ended in Pittsburgh. In addition, USAir operated 70
percent of the total flights from Pittsburgh.
Today, USAir has grown to become the largest air carrier in the Country
with respect to number of domestic passengers boarded per day. As seen in
Table 1, USAir boarded 61.7 million passengers in 1988, almost 2.7 percent
more than its nearest competitor, American Airlines (USAir, 1989). As of
August 5, 1989, USAir operated 3,004 flights per day; USAir Express
operated 1,441 per day. These flights were to 134 airports with USAir jet
service and 111 with USAir Express service in 36 states. USAir's major hubs
include Pittsburgh, Charlotte, and Baltimore/Washington International (see
Table 2). As of August 5, 1989, USAir operated a fleet of 425 aircraft,
displayed by type in Table 3. Another 115 aircraft are on firm order, with
options on an additional 151, giving USAir 266 aircraft that can be delivered
over the next 7 years ("USAir restructuring signals shift to post-merger
management," 1989). USAir employed 24,337 people throughout its
operation, and had operating income which has shown steady growth over
the past ten years (see Figure 6).
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Table 1
U.S. major airlines ranked bv domestic passengers boarded

Air
carrier

Passengers
(millions)

USAir
American
Delta
United
Continental
Eastern
Northwest
TWA
Pan Am

61.7
60.1
57.7
53.3
33.6
32.5
31.5
21.3
6.8

Table 2
USAir major hub operations as of August 5. 1989

Daily
Hub
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Charlotte
Baltimore/Washington Int'l
Dayton
Syracuse

jet

USAir Express
flights

285
119
300
157
81
58

daily flights
126
134
151
98
56
4

Of great interest is USAir's dominance in Pittsburgh. This is a key
factor to the success of PIT and the surrounding community. For example,
USAir is the area's second largest private sector employer, with 9,625 full
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Table 3
USAir fleet breakdown as of August 5. 1989

Aircraft

In Service

DC-9-30
MD-80
737-200
737-300
737-400
767-200 ER
F-100
BAel46
727-200
F-28 1000
F-28 4000

74
31
85
99
19
6
1
21
44
20
25
Total

425

Figure 6. Historic operating income for USAir.

and part-time employees. In the past five years alone, USAir has hired 3,317
new employees, almost a 53 percent increase. It currently occupies 33 jet
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gates and 22 commuter gates at PIT, or 62 percent of the available gate
capacity. USAir departures numbered 142,180 in 1988, or about 86 percent
of all operations. In fact, of the 8.97 million passengers boarded at PIT in
1988, 7.76 million were USAir customers. These passengers were on their
way to the 78 cities served by USAir from PIT ("USAir Pittsburgh
Highlights," 1989). Table 4 displays important statistics on USAir's growth
at PIT over the past five years.

Table 4
USAir statistics at PIT

Employees
Payroll (000)
Expenditures (000)
USAir:
Departures
Enplanements
USAir Express:
Departures
Enplanements

19$4

1985

1986

1987

1988

6,308
246,000
449,000

7,028
353,000
611,00

7,666
378,000
599,000

8,424
417,000
667,000

9,625
578,000
920,000

81,081
4,800

88,666
5,600

93,152
6,100

95,433
6,800

100,901
7,100

27,010
330,368

35,158
428,057

36,178
437,128

37,721
487,423

41,279
528,126

Because of USAir's position at PIT, any actions taken on its part will
directly impact the environment. By the same token, most major decisions to
be made by the airport officials, must include concurrent agreement by
USAir. The significance of this arrangement have proved to be crucial to the
success of Midfield.
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Chapter Three
Developmental Status at PIT

With the beginning of construction of the Midfield Terminal in June
1987, came a host of developments that are crucial to the success of USAir as
well as PIT and the surrounding community. The project is much more than
a new terminal building. It represents a major commitment on the part of
USAir to the Pittsburgh area, and to the entire air traffic system. It also has
many economic implications that must be examined.

Midfield Terminal

The major reason for the construction of the Midfield Terminal at PIT
initially was not to handle increased passenger traffic loads. In fact, Midfield
was proposed over twenty years earlier, when traffic demands were only a
fraction of what they are today. Granted, the plan has undergone many
revisions and expansions, but the concept has endured. One of the major
reasons has been the political stability of Allegheny County (Fotos, 1989).
When Midfield was proposed initially, Tom Foerster was one of three County
Commissioners. Mr. Foerster still serves in that capacity, and has proved
instrumental in keeping the project alive.
It has only been recently that the need for the Midfield Terminal has
become crucial to the success of both USAir and the continued economic
development of the area. USAir has grown to limits beyond the ability of the
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current terminal. If the local government wanted the valuable giant to
remain in the area, accommodations would have to be made. These
accommodations took the form of a new terminal to handle the increases in
passenger traffic. It has been estimated by airport planners that the
additional gates and more efficient configuration will allow the airport to
handle 40 percent more passengers (Fotos, 1989). The major portion of those
passengers are USAir passengers.

Structure
The first phase of construction involved the removal of tall earthen
obstructions, followed by the concealment of numerous valleys and drainage
ditches with earth. These operations involved over 18 million cubic yards of
earth at a cost of $42 million, and involved 500 people working around the
clock (Fraser, 1988). This was a massive undertaking in itself, and was
scheduled to take two full years.
Once all site work was completed, construction of the terminal itself
began towards the end of 1989. The Midfield Terminal building is expected
to take about three years to complete, and has a projected completion date of
October 1992. Between 30 and 50 separate contractors will be working on
the project at any one time (Fraser, 1988). The project will involve over 5,000
workers at its peak, creating massive logistical problems for both the airport
officials trying to maintain operations, and the airlines who may suffer
financial losses from delays (Vercellotti, 1990, January 13). The construction
of the Midfield Terminal is so large that over five miles of temporary roads
had to be built just to accommodate the construction traffic. In fact, this
project is the largest current airport development in the nation (Fotos, 1989).
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As the name implies the new terminal will be located in the middle of
the airfield, approximately one and a half miles west of its present site (see
Figure 7). The entire project entails more than just a new terminal building.
Three separate main buildings will be constructed: an airside terminal, a
landside terminal, and a central services building. The total square footage
of these three buildings will be in excess of 1.2 million square feet (Tasso
Katselas Associates, Inc. 1986).
The initial construction plans called for an airside facility with 63
gates, and account for 58.6 percent of the total terminal square foot area.
The general appearance of the terminal will be "X" shaped to accommodate
the largest possible number of aircraft in the least amount of space. Initially,
200 different terminal configurations were examined. That figure was
narrowed to 90, then to two, before the current design was chosen. The
landside building will be located approximately 2,340 feet west of the airside
building, and constitutes 32.7 percent of the total terminal square foot area.
The two will be connected with an underground people mover system, which
will make the journey in 63 seconds ("Facts about Greater Pittsburgh,"
1990). Between the landside and airside terminal building will be a central
services building, which make up the remaining 8.7 percent of the total
terminal square foot area. This building will be used for a variety of
purposes including commissary kitchens, maintenance rooms, police
headquarters, and many other functions. But this structure will also act as
the commuter terminal boarding area. In addition to the 75 jet gates,
twenty-five commuter gates have been planned. These facilities were placed
in this location to provide for unimpeded expansion of trunk carriers at the
airside terminal when necessary. Incremental expansion of commuter airline
operation will also be greatly enhanced under this configuration.

a

Present terminal

Midfield Terminal
construction site

Figure 7. Midfield Terminal construction site.
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The Midfield project also entails the construction of various other
facilities. New accesses for both aircraft, and service and emergency vehicles
must be built to assure cost effective and timely access to all airfield
facilities. These include new taxiways and apron areas. Over eleven lane
miles of new roads will also have to be built. In addition, over 17,000 new
parking spaces will be provided for employees, rental cars, and passengers.
Moving sidewalks will connect the parking facilities and the landside
terminal. These sidewalks will also be placed in the arms of the "X" shaped
terminal to aid passenger movements (Tasso Katselas Associates, Inc. (1986).
As a result of the turbulent history of the airport in terms of balancing
capacity and demand, one would expect that officials would go to great
lengths to assure that any new structures would be capable of sustaining
future requirements. But only a short time into the site preparation work, it
was realized that the initially planned 63 gates would be inadequate for the
demand of the airlines. According to Tom Foerster, Allegheny County
Commissioner, an additional 12 gates were needed to meet demand
(Donavan, 1988). Traffic was increasing at a rate above that anticipated by
planners. As a result the plans for the terminal had to be modified once
again. The design of the new facility allows for sections of the arms to be
added on with little disruption to the passengers or flight operations. After
these modifications had been made to reflect the additional airline demand,
the terminal construction stands at 75 jet gates. Figure 8 represents the
general layout of the new Midfield Terminal. But problems may still exist.
The current Director of Aviation at PIT, Scott R. O'Donnell, stated that it is
conceivable that the terminal could fill all possible 100 gates by the time
construction is completed, especially if another airline wanted to establish a
mini-hub in Pittsburgh (Belko, 1988).

Figure 8. Midfield Terminal layout.
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Because of the design of the terminal, PIT is not bound by the same
set of constraints it was under with the old terminal (land and runway
interference). In fact, officials are talking about the possibility of adding
another "X" shaped terminal east of the one under construction, if traffic
demands continue to increase. The people mover system would be extended
to reach the second terminal (see Figure 9). According to USAir, it may be
necessary to increase its number of gates at Midfield beyond the current 53
by an additional 10 (Belko, 1989). Since USAir is the major tenant, any
expansion would be tied directly to their operational planning. Also,
according to Richard Balotti, Principal planner at PIT, the second "X" shaped
extension will be studied mainly to rule it out as a viable alternative
(personal communication, May 16,1990). It is more likely that any
additional terminal will be placed towards the southern end of the airport
property.

Financing
Initially, the Terminal was to cost $503 million (Blazina, 1987, June
10). But the estimates of the Midfield Terminal project have increased over
the course of its development due to the additional gates, and because of
errors in the estimation process to include inflation. The total cost of the
project is now at $567 million.
One of the major keys to the success of the Midfield Terminal project
has been the method in which it is being financed. A project of this size,
complexity and duration called for unique financing methods. On July 29,
1987, an agreement between USAir and Allegheny County was signed which
included the formula for sharing cost savings and cost overruns of the
Midfield Terminal construction. The airlines will pay the first $487.5 million
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Figure 9. Possible future expansion plans at PIT.
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of the terminal project through various rents and fees. These funds will be
used to retire revenue bonds the County will issue to build Midfield Terminal
(Linn, 1987).
Allegheny County and the Pennsylvania State Government are
putting up $127.5 million; an unprecedented amount according to airport
officials. According to Tom Foerster, the State of Pennsylvania contributed
$85 million. The County is providing $42.5 million and the rest of the
construction cost is being financed with revenue bonds. (Vercellotti, 1990,
January 13). Allegheny County sold $524 million in bonds in 1 1/2 hours,
with yields of between 6.9 and 8.3 percent. A major factor in the quick sale
of the bonds was the signing of a 30 years lease by USAir. This effectively
decreased the risk of default on the County's part. In addition, PIT was
attempting to secure direct Federal aid to match the 127.5 million from State
and local Governments. Success in securing these funds would be an
indication that the Federal Government officials expect substantial economic
benefits to result from the Midfield Terminal project. (Fotos, 1989).
Unfortunately, the Federal Government only saw fit to contribute 47 percent
of the $127.5 million sought, or just under $60 million (Vercellotti, 1990,
January 13). Additional financial resources have been secured to allow for
potential cost overruns and additions to the initial design.

Economic Impact

Area
While the development of a midfield terminal has been discussed for
over twenty years, it has only recently been deemed necessary to the
continued development of both the airline industry, and the local economy. It
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has been estimated by the South Western Regional Planning Commission
that the new terminal and economic development that coincide with it, will
result in over 20,000 new jobs (Blazina, 1987, June 27). In addition, the
development of the airport area will bring in an estimated $9 billion over the
next 20 years (Fotos, 1989).
The construction of Midfield requires the planning and construction of
an entirely new access highway because of the new location of the Terminal.
This highway is commonly referred to as the Southern Expressway, and is
just the first phase of a road construction program planned by the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDot). The first phase of
the project carries an estimated cost of $135 million, and includes the major
access road from the current highway to the Midfield Terminal. According to
the Southwest Regional Planning Commission, the Southern Expressway
will open 1,000 acres for commercial development and create 20,000 new jobs
(Blazina, 1987, June 27).

USAir
While the construction of the Southern Expressway may be a great
benefit to the community, it could prove to be a liability for USAir, at least in
the short term. Construction of the Southern Expressway is projected to
take 30 months, with the completion coming around March 1993, six months
after the projected opening of Midfield. Originating and destination
passengers (O & D) will be delayed and inconvenienced because of the
construction. Without the expressway, access to Midfield will only be
obtained through the use of a "back door" road with only one lane in each
direction (Grata, 1990). Passengers will be required to board shuttle buses
for this trip. This may cause a negative effect for USAir in goodwill. Great
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efforts should be taken to assure the concurrent completion of the two
projects.
Several factors will have a great impact on USAir operations as a
result of the location of the Midfield Terminal. First of all, one of the greatest
operating costs associated with the airlines is the fuel cost. According to the
USAir's 1988 Annual Report, fuel and oil expenses amounted to $638.5
million or just over 12.1 percent of total operating expenses. Unfortunately,
a large portion of that fuel was spent taxiing aircraft to terminals great
distances from the runways. As a result of the efficient placement of
Midfield, it has been estimated that USAir will be able to save in excess of
$10 million (Colodny, 1987). According to James Frazier, Director of
Operations and Facilities for USAir, the savings are not a result of shorter
distances between runway and terminal, but are due to improved efficiency
of movement (personal communication, May 16,1990). Taxi distances will
actually increase, but throughput efficiency is the better measure.
Second, because of the reduced taxiing times, USAir will be able to
realize great savings in flight crew compensation, because block time for
crew members will be reduced accordingly. Block time is the standard for
which air crews are compensated, and is defined as the time the aircraft
moves under its own power, until it reaches the gate at its destination. A
reduction in these times can mean substantial savings over extended periods.
Third, a reduction in taxiing time will also lead to better operating
efficiency and scheduling. Less time will be spent attempting to cross
runways to reach the terminal. These times can be quite extensive at large
airports. USAir will be able to reap the benefits of a greater on time
performance, or at least minimize delays caused by airport facihties logjams.
Aircraft utilization will increase resulting in improved profitability. This
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situation has become a problem for USAir. Their on time performance rating
has been consistently below its major competitors. For example, in February
1990 only 74.8 percent of USAir flights arrived within fifteen minutes of
their scheduled arrival time (Kohnfelder, 1990). The industry average is 78
percent.

Current Operational Conditions

The airline industry is facing a critical time in its development. An
inverse relationship exists between the number of air carriers and the size of
those air carriers. As a result of deregulation the number of air carriers has
been shrinking. The size of the remaining companies has been increasing.
Some have argued that this situation has led to an inefficient market
situation which approaches a monopoly simple because of the few
competitors. Others believe that larger airline companies can take
advantage of economies of scale to provide a better service at a decreased
rate. Determining which position is accurate is not the subject of this
research. But one cannot overlook certain operational characteristics of
these large post deregulatory airlines. The major aspect that must be
addressed is the dominance of an airport by one or two individual airlines.
PIT is the second largest airport in the country in land mass with over
12,000 square acres, second to Dallas/Fort Worth ("Facts About Greater
Pittsburgh," 1990). According to the FAA Terminal Area Forecasts (TAF),
(1989) PIT is currently ranked 15th in the nation in terms of passengers, and
16th with regard to operations (see Tables 5 and 6). The FAA estimated PIT
to be the fastest growing airport in the country. The FAA expects PIT to
grow to be the eighth busiest airport by the year 2000 with a projected 38
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Table 6
US air carrier airports ranked bv operations

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Citv

State

Chicago
Atlanta
Dallas
Los Angeles
Denver
San Francisco
St. Louis
Newark
New York (LGA)
Detroit
Minneapolis
Miami
Boston
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Houston
Memphis
Honolulu
New York (JFK)
Las Vegas
Cumulative percentage

IL
GA
TX
CA
CO
CA
MO
NJ
NY
MI
MN
FL
MA
AZ
PA
TX
TN
HI
NY
NV

Operations
(000)
703,763
579,898
492,591
416,063
369,024
329,196
280,092
278,726
267,412
267,067
265,699
250,418
248,048
244,309
241,212
223,833
217,145
214,028
205,954
192,610

Percent
5.38
4.43
3.76
3.18
2.82
2.52
2.14
2.13
2.04
2.04
2.03
1.91
1.90
1.87
1.84
1.71
1.66
1.63
1.57
1.47
60.80

Airport Layout
The FAA has designated PIT as a Terminal Control Area (TCA)
Group II, which indicates that there is a moderately high level of air traffic
in the area. Group II TCA's require specific equipment aboard aircraft to
allow for adequate separation by air traffic controllers. PIT is one of 14 such
TCA's (Federal Aviation Regulations and Airman's Information Manual.
1989).

42
million passengers annually ("Facts about Greater Pittsburgh," 1990). These
figures alone have great impact. The conditions at the top 20 airports take
on more significance when it is realized that they are responsible for almost
58 percent of all enplaned passengers and 50 percent of total operations at all
domestic commercial airport facilities.

Table 5
Top 20 US air carrier airports ranked bv enplaned passengers

Rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Citv
Chicago
Atlanta
Los Angeles
Dallas
Denver
New York (JFK)
San Francisco
Newark
Miami
New York (LGA)
Boston
St. Louis
Detroit
Honolulu
Phoenix
Minneapolis
Pittsburgh
Houston
Orlando
Seattle

State

Passengers
(000)

IL
GA
CA
TX
CO
NY
CA
NJ
FL
NY
MA
MO
MI
HI
AZ
MN
PA
TX
FL
WA

27,175
22,808
20,794
20,060
15,786
13,871
13,678
11,808
11,294
11,237
10,711
9,811
9,527
9,199
8,800
8,670
8,006
7,260
7,179
7,042

Cumulative percentage

Percen

6.17
5.18
4.72
4.55
3.58
3.15
3.11
2.68
2.56
2.55
2.43
2.23
2.16
2.09
2.00
1.97
1.82
1.65
1.63
1.60

57.83

PIT operates with four basic runways: three of these runways are
parallel to one another, and use the designator 28/10 right, left, and center.
Their lengths are 11,500 feet, 10,502 feet, and 8,040 feet. The fourth runway,
22/14, is a shorter crosswind runway that cuts across two of the parallels,
and is 8,101 feet (See Figure 10).
All runways are equipped with Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) for
inclement weather. They are also rated for up to Category 3 operations,
which have stringent aircraft equipment and pilot qualification
requirements. According to the FAA controlled tower at PIT, controllers are
rarely called upon to use this mode of operation. Category 2 operations
constraints are in effect the majority of the time.
According to the FAA air traffic control (ATC) facility at PIT, because
of the prevailing wind direction the airport operates in a westerly direction
approximately 75 to 80 percent of the time. During these periods departing
aircraft use runways 28 right, 28 left, and 28 center. Arrivals are
accommodated on runways 32, 28 left and 28 right. During the remaining 25
to 30 percent of the time, departures occur on runways 14, 10 right, 10
center, with arrivals on runways 10 left, 10 right, and 10 center. This
preferential runway assignment is due to both noise abatement procedures
and efficient traffic movements.
Adjacent to PIT are several separate entities that also use the airfield
facilities. They include the 911th Air Force Reserve base which operates C130 cargo aircraft, and is located on the eastern fringe of the airport. The
Pennsylvania Air National Guard (PAANG) also maintains a base on the
southern fringe of the airport. The PAANG operates KC-135 Strato-tankers
(Boeing 707), and the A-7 fighters. USAir operates one of its main
maintenance bases at the airport. Each of these groups places an additional
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demand on the facilities in addition to commercial operations, and must be
recognized. Generally, these operations amount to 9 percent of total
operations.
In 1989, PIT had annual operations totaling 376,786 of which 344,320
were commercial operations. Of those, USAir accounted for over 296,100
operations, or over 86 percent of the operations. Approximately 60 percent of
the passengers on those flights were connecting to other flights, while the
remaining 40 percent were returning to Western Pennsylvania ("Facts about
Greater Pittsburgh," 1990).
The majority of traffic at PIT is of a commercial nature.
Approximately 91 percent of the traffic is commercial. While the name of the
airport indicates "international" traffic, this is only a small portion of traffic.
Consequently, most aircraft are in the "C" class, or 12,500 pounds to 300,000
pounds, as developed in the FAA's Airport Capacity and Delay Handbook
(1983, AC 150/5060-5). This is the case because most international flights
involve the larger aircraft such as the Boeing 747 or the Lockheed L-1011.
At PIT, since USAir operates approximately 80 percent of the flights, the
aircraft type breakdown will parallel USAir's fleet breakdown. For example,
in 1987 almost 71 percent of all domestic commercial departures from PIT
were flown on Douglas DC-9's or Boeing 737's. These same two aircraft
make up nearly 65 percent of USAir's fleet. This situation will have more
impact when capacity calculations are discussed in subsequent chapters
because of ATC separation.
In an effort to gain complete understanding of the circumstances at
PIT under the current conditions, and to accurately portray the nature of
this environment in the future, the methods by which aviation forecasts are
made must be examined. Accurate forecasts will not only allow for timely
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and appropriate expenditures of public funds, but may be able to avoid
operational deficiencies for commercial air carriers.

Chapter Four
Operations Forecasting
With the opening of Midfield Terminal in 1992, PIT will be one of the
most modern facilities in the country. The terminal design will immediately
improve the efficiency of passenger and aircraft movement, and will have
flexibility in terms of capacity to meet future demands. The question is
whether there will be an increase in demand as a result of the new terminal.

Current Terminal Utilization Projections

One of the major issues concerning the expansion of PIT will be the
effect of additional gate space of Midfield Terminal on the volume of future
operations. In 1988 there were 258,492 commercial air carrier operations
(excludes air taxi operations) at PIT (County of Allegheny, 1989). Each of the
53 gates was responsible for accommodating 4,877 operations annually, or
13.4 operations per day. USAir was responsible for 201,802 air carrier
operations. Each if its 33 gates handled 6,115 operations per year, or 16.8
per day.
The major cause for expansion in gate space at PIT is due mainly to
the airline's growth, especially USAir. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
these airlines have concrete plans to utilize their increased capacity at
Midfield. They are financially responsible for additional gates, and would
not have assumed this responsibility if they had no intention of increasing
service.

If the current gate utilization is maintained PIT can expect an
immediate increase in operations when Midfield opens in 1992. Total
commercial air carrier operations have the potential to increase to 366,825.
USAir operations may increase by as much as 61 percent to 324,996. The
fact that these gates are only used during the peak operating times (7:30 AM
to 9:30 PM.) underscores the problem further. For USAir, the 16.8 operations
per day actually occur in a 14 hour period. These figures also indicate the
limitations of Midfield Terminal (with 75 gates). When commercial
operations at PIT exceed 366,825, additional terminal capacity will be
needed.
The potential increase in operations according to gate utilization
figures do not take into consideration growth in any other areas. Expansion
into new markets, increases in air cargo activity, or the establishment of an
international gateway will all cause "new" increases in operations.
Central to any suggestion of future increases in operations must be the
limitations of current facilities, especially runway capacity. In addition, one
must also look at whether additional capacity may be achieved utilizing an
adaptation of existing facilities or procedures. If this type of approach were
used, great cost savings may be realized.
The first step to answering this question is to develop an appropriate
forecasting technique to adequately predict future needs. The timing of
these needs will also be paramount. What is to follow is an evaluation of
forecasting techniques, and their past performance. Specific areas will be
highlighted which do not fall into the standard forecasting techniques. The
ultimate goal will be to arrive at the most realistic forecast of traffic at PIT.

Forecasting Techniques

There are three basic methods in forecasting future operations. The
first, and most common, is the time series models. Unfortunately, these
models have a severe drawback in forecasting traffic demand at PIT. They
all assume that future traffic activity will continue according to past
performance. They do not allow for any unusual occurrences such as drastic
increases or decreases due to unforeseen conditions or unusual growth. In
addition, they do not react to changes in seasonal fluctuation of cyclical
variation, and are slow to react to shifts in the general trend.
Causal forecasting models usually consider several other variables
related to the one being predicted. Once these related variables have been
found, a statistical model is built and used to forecast the variable of interest.
Paramount to the success of this type of model is to find the best statistical
relationship between variables. They may also include historic information.
The most common quantitative causal forecasting model is regression
analysis. In this method, past data of two or more variables are compared,
and an equation is developed. This equation is a straight line that has the
best possible "fit" in terms of the data points. This line can then be extended
into future periods to forecast the variable in question. This method will
become very difficult if the independent variable is just as difficult to define
(ex. gross national product, unemployment rate).
And finally, judgmental forecasting models are somewhat different
from those discussed thus far in that they do not involve any specific
quantitative methods for arriving at a forecast. Rather, they use the
experience and foresight of individuals that have extensive exposure in the
area in which the forecast is being made. Greater emphasis is placed on

qualitative or subjective information. These models are especially useful
when subjective factors are expected to be very important, or when accurate
quantitative data is difficult to find.

Activity Forecast

While it is not the objective of this paper to develop an accurate traffic
forecasting model, the success of this research does depend on determining,
accurately, the level of activity at PIT in the future. In terms of predicting
the volume of traffic at PIT none of the forecasting techniques discussed thus
far will yield acceptable results. Therefore, a combination of these methods
will be applied. They will be applied to three specific forecasts of future
activity: the FAA, USAir, and PIT's planning department. This will be done
to arrive at a composite estimate of future activity.

FAA Terminal Area Forecasts
As the Federal Governments arm to assure compliance with
regulations and to assure safety in air travel, the FAA has the responsibility
to produce forecasts of activity. This is accomplished in the FAA's TAF
forecasts, which are produced annually. These forecasts are produced to
show the trends in aviation, the distribution of both passengers and traffic,
and to disseminate historical data. For any one airport, past information
relating to operations and passengers are given, along with a projection of 15
years into the future.
The model the FAA uses is extremely complex, and takes into account
a large quantity of variables, to include airport information, gross national
product, forecasts of leading economic indicators, and so on. It may be

52

viewed as an econometric model, subject to all of the risks associated with
this type of forecast. A change in any of these variables will have an impact
on the accuracy of the forecast.
Historically, the TAF for PIT have shown mixed results in terms of
accuracy. Figure 11 shows the FAA's forecast for operations against the
actual number of operations.

—- Actual
•D-1979
--1980
-©-1981
-A-1982
•A-1984
•X-1985
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'84
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Figure 11. FAA TAF's historic performance at PIT.

Subsequent lines depict the TAF forecast for the years indicated. Forecasts
for earlier periods were somewhat less than acceptable, whereas those for
more recent years seem to be very good. While generalizations about the
accuracy of a forecast based on several data points would be a mistake, the
accuracy of years 1984, 1985, and 1987 are the best available. This can be
seen further by Figure 12, which is a graphical representation of the TAF
forecasts absolute error.

Figure 12. FAA TAF's absolute error at PIT.

On average, the FAA was in error in their forecasts by an average 24.1
percent in 1979, 15.7 percent in 1980, 14.5 percent in 1981, and 12.3 percent
in 1982. However, the forecast for 1984, 1985, 1987 have proved to be much
more accurate, with only a .7 percent, 1.3 percent, and 2 percent error
respectively. Data from years 1983 and 1986 are unavailable. In addition,
not enough information is available to assess the forecasting accuracy since
1986. Figure 13 depicts the FAA's TAF forecast of operations into 2005. The
major aspect of this forecast is the tremendous jump in operations that
occurs between 1992 and 1994.

USAir Activity Forecasts
The air travel industry is different from other industries in many
respects. However, in terms of competitive advantage and corporate
planning it is similar. For that reason, USAir was extremely guarded in
providing information on their plans for PIT. Although valuable insight into
the general direction of its expectations was obtained, quantitative measures
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Figure 13. FAA TAF forecast of operations at PIT.

were lacking.
In an effort to obtain information concerning the operation of USAir at
PIT, interviews were conducted with James Frazier, who is the Director of
Operations and Services at PIT. According to Frazier, USAir has no forecast
of activity that can be made public (personal communication, May 24,1990).
He did, however, indicate that because of the expansion in gates from 33 to
53 (61 percent), it would be logical to expect a substantial increase in flight
activity once Midfield opens. Frazier stopped short of quantifying his
statement, but speculated that the increase would be less than 61 percent.
Edwin Colodny also stated that the increase in gates will permit USAir to
add a significant number of new cities with nonstop service to PIT (Flanigan,
1989).
The increase in flight activity will come from strengthening the
position of existing markets by increasing the flight frequency. The growth of
USAir at PIT will come from several other specific areas. First, international
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traffic will increase. USAir has initiated service to Frankfurt, West Germany
on June 15,1990, and has requested three additional international gates at
PIT (at Midfield). Steps are being taken to initiate service to Mexico and
London. Frazier stated that Canadian markets also have growth potential.
Growth into these areas is not only profitable, but also because USAir is
attempting to remain competitive.
The second major area which will impact activity at PIT is the level to
which USAir will service its existing route structure. Because of the PSA
merger, more flights are needed to service the West Coast. PIT plays a major
role in servicing this area.
And finally, as a result of the hub activity, an increase in the ratio of
connecting passengers and O & D passengers may shift more drastically in
favor of the connecting passengers. Currently, the split is approximately 60
percent connecting, and 40 percent 0 & D passengers. This shift will be
indicative of increased operations.
Because of the lack of any substantive forecast on USAir's part,
Frazier evaluated the forecasts made by the FAA. According to the TAF,
when Midfield opens, operations will jump by approximately 34,000
operations annually, or 93 a day. Nearly 80 percent of those operations, or
27,200, will be USAir operations. This works out to be approximately 75
additional operations daily, which in Frazier's words "was not unrealistic to
expect". It is also important to remember that other tenants at PIT have
increased their volume of gates at Midfield, which indicates that they will
increase their activity as well.
The validity of the TAF forecasts cannot be taken for granted. By the
same token, few alternatives exist. Frazier stated that the FAA's TAF
forecasts were the best public information available regarding the forecast of

traffic activity. He also indicated that a maximum of three years data be
used to make projections into the future. Data older than three years is
much less reliable, and does not allow for unusual circumstances.
Many factors will affect the day to day operation of PIT in the future.
Economic development, airspace capacity, passenger demand, tenant growth,
and facility expansion are but a few of the items that will have a bearing on
the activity level. All of these considerations will have an impact on the
status of USAir activity. But USAir is not in a position to assess the overall
conditions of the airfield in 1992. In addition, USAir has a vested interest in
its view of the conditions at PIT. Airport officials, on the other hand, must
take into consideration many other viewpoints when making decisions.
These include local business, Federal and local governments, other airline
tenants, and a host of other interested parties. This format improves the
quality of the decision making because the outcome does not necessarily have
the best interests of one party in mind. For that reason, more weight should
be placed on the approach PIT officials pursue.

PIT Activity Forecasts
PIT is operated by the Allegheny County Department of Aviation, and
is directly under the control of the three Allegheny County Commissioners.
All major policy decisions go through the Director of Aviation, Scott
O'Donnell, and ultimately to the County Commissioners Office, who must
approve all major projects. The Board of Commissioners looks to the
Planning Department to provide timely and accurate information concerning
the airport to be used in the decision making process. Because of limited
personnel and expertise, the Planning Department often uses outside
consultants to conduct specific studies that relate to the operation of the

airport. These studies are provided as supplemental information, in
conjunction with the Planning Department's input, to aid the Board of
Commissioners in decision making. As a function of the planning process at
PIT three formal forecasts have been identified that attempt to predict the
level of activity in the future. Two forecasts are from third party consulting
firms, and the third is a Federal Government forecast. Each will be
discussed noting strengths and weaknesses.

Master Plan Forecast. As required by the FAA, PIT is in the process of
updating its Master Plan. The Master Plan is the blueprint for operation for
a period often years, and indicates the growth expected, areas in which it is
expected, and the actions the airport will take to accommodate these
changes. It also includes a one year capital plan and a five year capital plan.
In PIT's case, work on what was supposed to be the 1990 Master Plan has
fallen behind schedule. A conscious decision was made to hold off on the
1990 Master Plan because of the volume of changes taking place at Midfield.
According to Richard Balotti, Project Manager, this was done because of the
inability of constructing a master plan when in the process of altering so
much under the 1980 Master Plan (personal communication, May 16, 1990).
For that reason, the 1990 Master Plan will not be completed until late 1991
at the very earliest. PIT places great emphasis on its Master Plan to make
decisions - more than most airports - especially in a period in which large
growth is taking place.
Balotti stated that the first issue to be addressed in the 1990 Master
Plan will be to identify the location for a fifth air carrier runway, which is
supposed to be accomplished within the first six months. As a component of
the Master Plan, there are eight special supplemental studies. These include
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Airfield Modeling, Land Use Management, Marketing, Ground
Transportation Plan, Economic Impact Analysis, and an Air Space
Evaluation. These special studies are designed to address areas that will be
affected as a result of Midfield Terminal project.
As mentioned before, master plans are used to budget funds, plan for
capital improvement, and to plot the general direction for the airport. A
majority of these type of decisions revolve around the activity expected at the
airport. In PIT's case this is no different. As can be seen in Figure 14, PIT's
forecasts have been fairly accurate.
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Figure 14. PIT operations forecast accuracy.

Unfortunately, as a result of the quantity and volume of changes taking place
at the airport, these forecasts will be rendered useless when the Midfield
Terminal opens.
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Aviation Planning Associates. Because so much has changed since
1980 in terms of airport facilities and the demand to use those facilities, a
different activity forecast needed to be constructed which would more
adequately represent the true nature of traffic. As part of an Airfield
Alternatives Evaluation study to identify alternative runway locations
commissioned in 1987 by PIT, Aviation Planning Associates (AvPlan)
attempted to forecast activity at the airport up to the year 2010. Figure 15 is
a representation of their estimates of operations at PIT.
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Figure 15. AvPlan operations forecast at PIT.

These figures closely parallel those produced in PIT's 1980 Master Plan.
Under conditions where steady growth is expected, and only minor facility
improvements are planned, this forecasts may prove to be adequate.
However, PIT is in the process of undertaking a project near $.6 billion,
which will drastically change the nature of the airport and the prospects for
its future. The AvPlan forecast does not recognize any increase whatsoever

for additional traffic which will be generated as a result of expansion from 53
gates to 75. This fact alone renders these gates relatively useless in terms of
forecasting traffic. According to the AvPlan study, PIT will grow at a rate
below the national average, while Balotti stated that once Midfield Terminal
opens in 1992 that will not be the case. He had no idea of the growth rate to
expect in 1992, but stated that it will certainly be above the national
average. In addition, the AvPlan study used only one year's worth of data to
make predictions about future traffic levels. The main purpose of the study
was to identify specific real estate tracts that needed to be preserved for
runway expansion, and not to predict activity levels.

Peat Marwick Mitchel. PIT has one additional forecast of activity that
is worth discussing. PIT commissioned Peat Marwick Main & Co., Airport
Consulting Service, to perform a study entitled Update of Airline Activity
Forecasts - Greater Pittsburgh International Airport, which was submitted
in November 1987. This report was limited in scope, dealing only with the
volume of commercial activity. It was also limited in the term of the forecast,
to years 1990 and 1995. Some of the issues addressed in this report have
merit, and will be mentioned.
According to Peat Marwick, there has been increased hubbing activity
at three major airports: Greater Cincinnati International, Detroit
Metropolitan, and Washington Dulles International. This has created
increased competition for connecting traffic in the eastern United States.
Connecting traffic is forecasted as being the major source of increases in
enplanements at PIT. Because of this uncertainty, high and low forecasts of
traffic have been devised. The low estimate takes into consideration the
potentially adverse impact of additional competition for connecting
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passengers from nearby hub airports. The high figure reflects the
assumption that the new terminal facilities will operate at or near capacity
by 1995.
As can be seen in Figure 16, these forecasts are somewhat different
from those discussed thus far. Activity levels for years in between 1990 and
1995 have been interpolated based on the annual percentage given in the
report.
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Figure 16. PMM operations forecast at PIT.

Again, the limited scope of this forecast, and its relative age, prevent its use
as a basis for predicting activity levels in 1992.
Great difficulty arises when seeking information regarding the level of
activity the airport expects in years to come. But, according to Richard
Balotti, who is also the Principal Planner for Allegheny County, PIT will use
the TAF forecasts developed by the FAA until such time as they can revise
their own forecasts. Balotti estimated that they should be completed
sometime within the next year (personal communication, May 16, 1990).

Research Forecasting Method Used

As a result of the unavailability of alternative forecasting figures from
PIT and from USAir, and because of the relatively accurate forecasts in
recent years by the FAA, the researcher will use the TAF forecasts as the
indicator of future traffic levels at PIT. This approach utilizes the causal
forecasting model the FAA uses, but will also recognize aspects of the
judgmental forecasting model. A major factor in the decision to use the TAF
forecast was its incorporation of the expansion of the terminal into their
annual forecast for PIT. The TAF forecasts take into consideration a host of
other variables that will have an effect on the volume of air travel, not only
at PIT, but throughout the entire air transportation system.
The function of the planning department at an airport cannot be
understated. The success of every project is contingent on accurately
knowing the state in some future period. Using the FAA's TAF forecasts as
the basis for projecting future operations, consideration can be given to
predicting the actual operational conditions at PIT when Midfield opens in
1992. Concerns that directly relate to the capacity limitations of the airfield
will also be scrutinized to indicate areas that require additional attention.
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Chapter Five
Runway Capacity Calculations

When analyzing the capacity constraints at an airport, two separate
elements must be examined. They are the capacity the facility is capable of
accommodating, and the activity level that it will be required to handle. In
PIT's case, there are specific limits on the actual number of operations that
can be sustained in any one hour period. This is referred to as the peak hour
capacity. Additional constraints on the landing capacity come in the form of
weather. ATC personnel are tasked with maintaining specific aircraft
separation to assure safety. As the weather conditions deteriorate, these
separation requirements increase, resulting in fewer operations per hour.
Good weather conditions are termed VFR, or visual flight rules, while poor
weather conditions are IFR, or instrument flight rules.
According to the FAA's Airport Capacity and Delay Handbook.
Advisory Circular 150/5060-5, PIT has the ability to sustain 126 VFR
operations per hour, or 118 IFR operations per hour. Factors that affect this
figure include the percentages and weights of aircraft using the airport
(aircraft mix), runway use configuration, percentage of touch-and-go's,
percentage of arrivals, airspace limitations, runway instrumentation, and
taxiway layout. The intention is not to prove the FAA calculations, but to use
them as a basis for estimating the ability of the current facility to handle
future traffic flows. With that as the basis, attention will be focused on the
capacity requirements at PIT.

Peak Operations Justifications

The manner in which the actual capacity of the airport is calculated
will have a bearing on whether it is already at capacity or not. There is an
extreme difference between the absolute ASV of the airport and the practical
volume of the facilities. For instance, at PIT the current runway
configuration is capable of handling an ASV of 1,033,680 IFR operations.
With operations in 1989 at 376,786, it would appear that the runway
facihties at PIT are operating at only 36 percent of capacity. But this figure
assumes that the demand to land is constant throughout a 24 hour day,
seven days a week, 365 days a year. It is unrealistic to expect that the
demand to land at an airport will ever be distributed in such a way.
Other methods of calculating capacity may be just as unrealistic. Most
airports have some sort of peak operating times throughout the course of the
day, week, or month. It would be a mistake to take the airport's absolute
busiest period, and construct facilities for the sole purpose of accommodating
this one particular period. The remainder of the time these runways and
terminals would be idle, at great cost to the taxpayers and, ultimately, to the
airlines travelers themselves.
The most logical approach would entail using a combination of the
absolute ASV and of peak operating times. Compromises would have to be
made on the part of the airlines and those operating the airport. A solution
would be to calculate runway demand based on the average activity levels on
an average day, but during the busier time of the year (peak month). This
would be the most appropriate method for several reasons. First, airline
companies have a limited number of aircraft, which must fly to generate
revenue. According to Frazier, USAir will fly its aircraft regardless of the

time of year. He said what they would do is manipulate the type of aircraft
to accommodate increases in passenger activity (personal communication
May 24, 1990). This, in effect, will have a tendency to balance the number of
operations, at least as far as commercial airlines are concerned.
Second, if any other method of calculating runway capacity is used,
potential business may be lost because of the inability of commercial entities
to service their customers. Perpetual delays because of lack of runway
capacity will cause decreased customer goodwill, forcing individuals to seek
alternative transportation. The end result will be a decrease in the number
of companies willing to do business in an atmosphere filled with delays.
Airport business would decrease and growth would be curtailed, causing
negative economic results for Allegheny County, surrounding communities,
and the airlines.
As with most industries, the airline industry is cyclical in nature. Not
only are there monthly variations in passenger and operation volumes, but
there are weekly and daily pulses in the use of airport facilities. In this
instance USAir and PIT are no exception. As you can see in Table 7,
passenger enplanements at PIT follow a definite annual pattern. Table 7
represents the average monthly breakdown of passenger activity for a period
of seven years. This information was collected from the Greater Pittsburgh
International Airport Analysis of Scheduled Airline Traffic (1983 1989).
Any attempt to draw conclusions based on information before this period will
be ineffective because of the PATCO strike and the fallout as a result of
deregulation. A seven year simple weighted average has been developed to
identify the busiest times of the year for PIT.
It is necessary to recognize peak passenger demand times for several
reasons. First of all, one must assure that adequate terminal facilities are
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Table 7
Average 7-year historic monthly passenger distribution at PIT

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Volume

%L

1,081,650
1,051,427
1,317,770
1,301,347
1,363,068
1,426,023
1,398,933
1,459,683
1,244,101
1,369,704
1,278,342
1,270,456

7.00
6.83
8.50
8.37
8.74
9.12
8.99
9.40
8.01
8.82
8.18
8.04

available to sustain rapid movement of passengers to connecting flights as
well as minimizing the time spent in the terminal for O & D passengers.
Second, passenger distribution will be vital in determining growth trends.
These statistics should be used to assess whether the increase in passenger
traffic is due to normal seasonal fluctuation or abnormal growth. This
situation will be crucial to determining if additional flights should be added
or cancelled.

Forecasted Runway Requirements at PIT

After having established the criteria for forecasting, and examining
the circumstances in which they will be applied, attention must be focused on
quantifying the actual level of activity which PIT must be capable of
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accommodating. But, because of the nature of forecasting, perfect
information is difficult to find. For that reason, certain assumptions and
adjustments to existing data had to be made. The basis for these
assumptions and adjustments will be explained.

Adjustments
Forecasted traffic at PIT will be examined according to the FAA's
breakdown of operations. These include four specific categories: air carrier,
air taxi/commuter, military, and general aviation (GA). According to officials
at PIT, the level of GA activity will be relatively stable over the forecast
period. In fact, in recent years it has declined slightly. Balotti stated that
this trend is expected to continue into the future, mainly because of the
increasing congestion at the airport, the increases in commercial activity, and
the landing fees associated with operating at PIT. In 1983, 84 percent of all
operations were of a commercial nature. By 1987 this figure had increased to
almost 91 percent (FAA Terminal Area Forecast, 1989). To more accurately
reflect the nature of activity, the forecast for GA activity will be adjusted to
reflect static annual operations of 27,000, which was the volume in 1987.
Actual figures from 1988 and 1989 have been less than 27,000, at 25,745 and
25,907 respectively. But for simplicity, 27,000 will be used to allow for the
possibility of moderate growth. This will not significantly affect the FAA's
forecast figures (the maximum error is less than 2 percent, which occurs in
the year 2005).

Assumptions
As the result of the unavailability of perfect information, three
assumptions were made regarding the distribution of operations at PIT.
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They include the correlation of air taxi/commuter operations with those of air
carrier, distribution of GA operations, and the distribution of military
operations.
First, as a result of the nature of the hub airports, many commuter
flights are utilized as feeders for the major air carriers. Consequently, this
study assumes the level of commuter activity will parallel that of the
commercial air traffic. This contention is backed up by the findings in the
AvPlan Study.
This can further be proven by examining the historic level of air
carrier operations in relation to the number of air taxi/commuter operations.
A correlation coefficient (r) was used to calculate the relationship between
the independent variable X, or air carrier operations, and the dependent
variable Y, or air taxi/commuter operations. The formula used was as
follows:

nIXY - IXSY

r=

y A n O T _ (£X)2] [nIY2 - (IY)2]

This method yields a value of r = .83, which indicates a relatively strong
positive relationship exists between the variables. A perfect positive
correlation would be r = 1. For that reason, the same breakdown in
percentage distribution will be used for the air taxi/commuter operations as
used for the air carrier operations.
Second, an additional assumption regarding the distribution of GA
activity will also be made. Because of the nature of GA activity, it is assumed
that the majority of traffic will be during the summer months because of good

69
meteorological conditions and the traditional vacation period. Therefore, GA
activity will be treated as following the same activity distribution as air
carrier activity.
And finally, it will be assumed that the level of military activity will be
relatively stable throughout the year. This assumption is based on past
activity, predictions made by the Planning Department at Allegheny County,
and the FAA TAF forecasts. This level will be approximately 7,500
operations annually, or 625 operations per month.

Peak Hour Demand/Capacity Calculations

Not only is it important to recognize what volume of traffic is expected,
but it is also important to have an idea of the distribution of that traffic.
This is required to assure adequate terminal facilities and runway capacity.
It will also prevent the possibility of "overkill" in constructing unnecessary
structures. Based on the assumptions and adjustments, an attempt can be
made at identifying the peak month for operations at PIT. To this end, the
1988 and 1989 historic commercial operations were averaged. Frazier stated
that USAir uses a maximum of three years of historic data to make
predictions. The data from 1988 and 1989 was the most recent information
available, and was most representative of the nature of operations at PIT. As
can be seen in Table 8, August is the busiest month for commercial
operations, followed closely by October and July.
The distribution of commercial air traffic is relatively stable
throughout the year. Frazier supports this contention with his statement
that USAir does not fluctuate in its level of flight activity throughout the
year (personal communication, May 24, 1990).
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Table 8
Monthly operations distributions at PIT

1988

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total

Simple
Average

1989

Volume

3k

Volume

%.

%.

28,289
27,198
30,009
29,144
30,441
30,681
30,850
31,486
29,848
30,462
29,016
29,715

7.92
7.62
8.40
8.16
8.52
8.59
8.64
8.82
8.36
8.53
8.12
8.32

29,220
26,553
28,958
28,292
28,955
28,086
28,783
29,411
28,381
30,117
28,929
28,635

8.49
7.71
8.41
8.22
8.41
8.16
8.36
8.54
8.24
8.75
8.40
8.32

8.20
7.66
8.41
8.19
8.47
8.37
8.50
8.68
8.30
8.64
8.26
8.32

357,139

344,320

The monthly variation is within 14 percentage points. This is also supported
by the findings in the AvPlan study. However, the AvPlan study identified
October as the busiest month, but only looked at one year's data November
1986 to October 1987. For purposes of this study, August will be viewed as
the peak month for operations.
To calculate the level of activity in number of operations, peak month
percentages were used. For the air carrier and air taxi/commuter, the
average peak month percentage of traffic was used, as already described
(8.68 percent). For the GA category, it was assumed that the activity level
will be 10 percent. This has been verified by an analysis of the Department
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of Aviation's operations records. The 10 percent figure is also consistent with
the AvPlan findings. Because of the small contribution of GA activity to the
total number of operations, the accuracy of the 10 percent figure will not
have a substantial impact on the results. Finally, as already mentioned,
military activity will be viewed as being equally distributed throughout the
year. This yields a 8.33 percent distribution of operations in any given
month.
Consistent with the researcher's reluctance to use the peak day of the
year, or peak day of peak month to calculate peak hour operations, the
average day within the peak month has been chosen. Because August has
been selected as the peak month, each category (air carrier, air
taxi/commuter, GA, and military) will be divided by 31 (number of days in
August) to arrive at the average number of daily operations within the peak
month.
As the result of discussions with airport officials and the USAir
Operations Division with regard to traffic activity, peak times will be viewed
as occurring in the second 12 hour period of the day; that is from 12:00 Noon
to 12:00 AM (PM percentage). According to Frazier, USAir has ten major
arrival banks at PIT. The heaviest traffic push occurs in the evening hours,
usually between 4:00 PM and 9:00 PM Bill Cannon, from the operations
section of the FAA Control Tower, also supports this contention (personal
communication, May 28, 1990). Calculation of peak hour operations will be
based on sustaining operations during the peak PM hour.
To analyze the number of operations that occur during the peak hour,
knowledge must be gained regarding the percentage of operations associated
with each of the four categories. There are only 12 hours to consider when
dealing with PM percentages. If traffic levels were equally distributed

throughout the 12 hour period the hourly percentage of operations would be
8.33 percent (100/12). But air traffic is not equally distributed. According to
the 1988 Official Airline Guide (OAG), 9.5 percent of total commercial air
carrier movements occurred during the peak hour of the average day of the
peak month. Air taxi/commuter activity is more responsive to peak hour
calculations. This is evident in their peak hour percentage, which is 10.7
percent. In other words, of the potential 100 percent of this category, 10.7
percent occurs during the peak hour (OAG, 1988). Because of the general
stability in GA operations, the distribution of this type of traffic is relatively
even throughout the day. According to FAA Control Tower Counts at PIT,
the majority of GA activity occurs during a 19.5 hour period. Therefore, the
percentage of GA activity during peak hour will be 5.1 percent (100/19.5).
And finally, the peak hour percentage for military operations was 12.3 (FAA
Control Tower Count). This increased figure can be explained by formation
flying, which results in simultaneous arrivals.
The FAA TAF forecast for PIT was applied using this procedure to
arrive at a forecast of total operations that can be expected during an
average day of the peak month, during the peak hour. Table 9 is the peak
hour analysis at PIT for the years 1990 to 2005.

Peak Hour Demand/Capacity Analysis

As can be seen, there is steady growth in the number of peak hour
operations up to 1992. At that point this steady growth is replaced by a
drastic increase in peak hour operations of 15.7 percent. This increase
coincides with the opening of the Midfield Terminal. Because Midfield
Terminal is scheduled to open in October 1992, a more accurate increase was
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Table 9
Forecasted peak hour runway capacity at PIT

1991

1990
Annual

Peak
a

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.
c

Annual

Peak

Pk. Mo. Pk. Mo.

a

Av.Da/ Pk. Hr.c

Ops

Mo.

Av.Da/

Pk. Hr.

Ops

Mo.

Air Carrier

269,000

23,349

753

72

275,000

23,870

770

73

AT/Commuter

106,000

9,201

297

32

109,000

9,461

305

33

27,000

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

409,000

35,833

1,156

110

418,000

36,614

1,181

112

GA
Military
Total:

1992
Annual

Peak

1993

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.
c

Annual

Peak

Pk. Mo. Pk. Mo.
Av.Da/ Pk. Hr.c

Ops

Mo."

Av. D a /

Pk. Hr.

Ops

Mo."

Air Carrier

281,000

24,391

787

75

309,000

26,821

865

82

AT/Commuter

113,000

9,808

316

34

117,000

10,156

328

35

27,000

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

428,000

37,482

1,209

115

460,000

40,260

1,299

123

GA
Military
Total:

1994
Annual

Peak
a

1995

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.
c

Annual

Peak

Pk. Mo. Pk.Mo.

a

Av.Da/ Pk. Hr.c

Ops

Mo.

Av. D a /

Pk. Hr.

Ops

Mo.

Air Carrier

340,000

29,512

952

90

348,000

30,206

974

93

AT/Commuter

122,000

10,590

342

37

126,000

10,937

353

38

27,000

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

496,000

43,385

1,400

133

508,000

44,426

1,433

137

GA
Military
Total:

(table continues)
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1997

1996
Annual

Peak

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.
c

Annual

Peak

Pk. Mo. Pk. Mo.

Ops

Mo."

A v . D a / Pk. Hr. c

Ops

Mo."

Av.Day"

Pk. Hr.

Air Carrier

356,000

30,901

997

95

364,000

31,595

1,019

98

AT/Commuter

130,000

11,284

36

39

135,000

11,718

378

40

27,000

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

520,000

45,468

1,467

140

533,000

46,596

1,503

144

GA
Military
Total:

1998
Annual

1999

Peak

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.

a

b

c

Av.Da/ Pk. Hr.c

99

381,000

33,071

1,067

101

392

42

145,000

12,586

406

43

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

546,000

47,725

1,540

147

560,000

48,941

1,579

150

Pk.Mo.

Pk.Mo.

Air Carrier

372,000

32,290

1,042

AT/Commuter

140,000

12,152

27,000

Total:

Pk.Mo. Pk. Mo.

a

Mo.

Mo.

Military

Peak

Ops

Ops

GA

Annual

Av.Day

Pk. Hr.

2000
Annual

2001

Peak

Pk.Mo.

Pk.Mo.

a

b

c

Ops

Mo.

Air Carrier

390,000

33,852

1,092

AT/Commuter

150,000

13,020

27,000

GA
Military
Total:

Av.Day

Pk. Hr.

Annual

Peak
a

A v . D a / Pk. Hr. c

Ops

Mo.

104

399,000

34,633

1,117

106

420

45

156,000

13,541

437

47

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

574,000

50,155

1,618

155

589,000

51,457

1,660

159

(table continues)
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2003

2002

Annual

Peak
a

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.
c

Peak

Pk.Mo. Pk.Mo.

Ops

Mo."

Av.Da/ Pk. Hr.c

Ops

Mo.

Av. D a /

Air Carrier

408,000

35,414

1,142

109

418,000

36,282

1,170

111

AT/Commuter

161,000

13,975

451

48

167,000

14,496

468

50

27,000

2,70

087

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

603,000

52,672

1,699

163

619,000

54,061

1,745

167

GA
Military
Total:

Pk. Hr.

Annual

2004

Annual

Peak
a

2005

Pk. Mo.

Pk. Mo.
c

Peak

Pk.Mo. Pk.Mo.

Ops

Mo."

Av.Da/ Pk. Hr.c

Ops

Mo.

Av. D a /

Air Carrier

427,000

37,064

1,196

114

437,000

37,932

1,224

116

AT/Commuter

174,000

15,103

487

52

180,000

15,624

504

54

27,000

2,700

87

4

27,000

2,700

87

4

7,000

583

19

2

7,000

583

19

2

635,000

55,450

1,789

172

651,000

56,839

1,834

176

GA
Military
Total:

Pk. Hr.

Annual

a

Peak month percentages:
Air Carrier
8.68%
AT/Commuter
8.68%
GA
10.00%
Military
8.33%

b

Peak month activity divided by 31 days.

c

Peak hour percentages:
Air Carrier
9.5 %
AT/Commuter
10.7 %
GA
5.1%
Military
12.3 %
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calculated by summing the increases for 1992 and 1993 (the first full year of
operation).
This increase in peak hour operations will have a tremendous impact
on PIT's ability to handle expected traffic. Figure 17 depicts the level of peak
hour operations in relation to what the FAA has set as the capacity of the
runways.
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Figure 17. Peak hour demand/capacity analysis.

It is clearly obvious that the demand to land during peak operating time will
exceed the facility's capacity in 1992. The situation does not get any better
in years to come. Continued growth over and above PIT's capability is
projected to continue into 2005.
These calculations are based on the forecast of activity at PIT utilizing
the number of gates anticipated at that time. It does not allow for an
expansion to more that 75 gates, which may occur in subsequent years. If
this expansion occurs, the actual traffic level may increase even further.

Consistent with one of the areas in which PIT may expand (international
gateway), a shift to heavy aircraft will also affect the capacity constraints by
increasing the required separation. This will have a bearing on the fleet mix
and ultimately on the calculations of legal capacity.
It is very important to recognize that an imbalance between airfield
capacity and the demand to use those facilities may exist. But it will also be
important to understand how these imbalances may affect operations at PIT.
In an effort to address this issue an economic examination of the situation
must be pursued.
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Chapter Six
Accommodating Forecasted Demand

The national issue of major traffic growth affecting the safety of air
travel is not an issue at PIT because of the ability to expand and
accommodate additional traffic. However, the ability to operate safely under
the current facility constraints will become an issue. It is the consensus of
officials at PIT that there will be a lack of adequate runway capacity in the
future. According to Balotti, the Planning Department has taken the
position of support for a fifth air carrier runway (personal communication,
May 16, 1990).
The dispute, however, arises when making an effort at pinpointing
when this shortage will reach critical proportions. According to Balotti, the
major problem in the past has been the limitations of the landside capacity.
In 1992, the limitation will shift from the landside capacity to the airside
capacity. Also, in 1989 USAir indicated its desire to have an additional
runway built because of what it had planned. However, USAir gave no
specifics. Its operational plans call for expansion at PIT, but because of their
competitive position, that information is not being released.
Presently, the airport capacity exceeds airport demand. But the future
growth of PIT as a major hub, and the status of the massive economic
development that has sprung up around the airport are in danger. Without
proper facilities to sustain operations when they are most beneficial,
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commercial entities will seek alternative locations to do business. In
addition, the massive investment in Midfield Terminal will have been a
waste of resources. The cost for additional highways and the thousands of
jobs that could be generated may be lost. In an effort to curb the possibility
of this occurring, several alternatives must be examined.

Problem Recognition

As already mentioned, both airport officials and airport tenants
recognize that a problem will exist in terms of runway capacity after 1992.
Maintaining the status quo will be counter productive and costly. Two
approaches to addressing this problem are currently under way. They are a
Terminal Airspace Review and a Capacity Enhancement Task Force Study.

Terminal Airspace Review
In an effort to address the capacity issues at PIT in the future, officials
have undertaken a series of studies. The overall project is entitled the
Terminal Airspace Review, and involves three specific areas: airport capacity,
airspace capacity, and airspace review. The issue of airport capacity is being
addressed in the 1990 Master Plan.
The second leg of the study involves not only the Planning Department
at PIT, but USAir and the FAA. The study is entitled The Airport Capacity
Efficiency Study. USAir, jointly with Allegheny County petitioned the FAA to
study the airspace conditions that will result when Midfield is open.
According to Frazier, the major issue to be addressed is the configuration of
the airspace that surrounds the airport (up to 30 miles). It also includes air
traffic practices. The major question to be answered will be whether the
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airspace above PIT has adequate capacity to handle the demand when
Midfield opens.
The third leg of the study involves a review of the overlying airspace,
which is governed by Cleveland Center in Ohio. The study will address the
question of whether this configuration is handling traffic in the most efficient
manner. Cleveland Center is in the Great Lakes Region, while PIT is in the
Eastern Region.

Capacity Enhancement Task Force
PIT has initiated the second approach to solving the problem. Their
study is designed to highlight areas of potential improvement in capacity,
and is called the Capacity Enhancement Task Force. As part of this study,
they have identified three possible ways to increase the capacity of PIT. The
first method includes operational changes. Certain procedures currently
used by the FAA in routing aircraft may be altered to allow for an increase in
the stated number of IFR and VFR operations each runway is legally capable
of sustaining. Two problems exist with this method of capacity enhancement.
First, the FAA has already established criteria on the capacity of the current
facilities. If these criteria are discarded, one would ask the question as to
whether the safety of the system has been compromised. Second, looking
back at Figure 17, an increase in the stated number of IFR and VFR runway
requirements will be pushing back the inevitable. This method may "buy
time", but at what cost?
The second method this task force identified were facility changes,
which will be discussed, shortly. And the third method was navigational
changes. These include the utilization of ATC equipment capable of
providing safe control while operating with reduced separation. Examples of

such technology include Microwave Landing Systems (MLS) and a new
system currently under development by the Bendix Corporation. This new
technology is called a Precision Runway Monitor, and uses phased array
radar to allow for simultaneous IFR approaches on close parallels of less
than 2,500 feet (Stevens, 1990). It should be noted that The Capacity
Enhancement Task Force study utilizes the FAA TAF forecasts as the basis
for forecasting until the updated 1990 Master Plan is complete.

Static Approach
There is one additional alternative available to airport officials - do
nothing. This is the most unattractive choice for several major reasons.
First, this would be an incredible waste of resources currently being
expanded on Midfield Terminal. Second, a cap on the volume of operations
would have to be enforced. Landing and departure slots would have to be
allocated on what might not be a fair basis. PIT may have to initiate bidding
for these slots, similar to JFK in New York. Clearly, this scenario is highly
unlikely, but may result, nevertheless.

Facility Alterations

The second area addressed by the Capacity Enhancement Task Force
was the facility changes. This option warrants considerable attention.
Alterations to the existing facility may add significantly to the capability of
runway capacity. This is the area in which the greatest increase in capacity
will be gained. Facility alterations may come in several different formats.
Each will be discussed in turn.

High Speed Exits
The idea of high speed exits have received much attention lately. The
sooner an aircraft exits a runway, the sooner another aircraft can land. High
speed exits allow an aircraft to exit the active runway at a greater speed.
This type of exit allows for as much as a 15 second savings in timed
separation. While this application will increase the number of operations
allowed on a given runway, it will not result in an increase capable of
sustaining the volume of operation expected in the future. Constructing high
speed exit will only benefit operations on runway 32/14, as all other runways
already have this treatment. It should be noted that the current high speed
exits on runway 28R/10L should be adjusted to accommodate the
predominant western flow of traffic. Aircraft land and depart in a western
direction 70 percent of the time.

Runway
The major alternative airport officials have at their disposal will be
the construction of new runway facilities. This would increase the volume of
peak hour operation by more than a token amount. The major decision at
this point will be deciding on the location of a new runway. To this end, the
AvPlan study has identified six alterative runway locations (see Table 10).
For various reasons which include limited increases in peak hour operation
and excessive cost, alternatives C, D, and E have been ruled out by Airport
Officials. According to Balotti, the most logical location for a new runway
would be alternatives A or B. He also stated that the Planning Department
has a preference for a fourth parallel rather than a parallel crosswind. The
most logical will be the fourth parallel.
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Table 10
Available runway alternatives
Alternative
A
B
C
D
E

Designator

Length

32/14
27/9
27/9
27/9
32/14

10,000
8,000
5,000
10,000
5,000

But several factors will affect the ultimate decision on the location of
the new runway. First and foremost will be the increase in peak hour
operation the two main alternatives will allow. According to the AvPlan
study, with the addition of a second crosswind runway PIT will have the
capability to accommodate an annual service volume of 625,564, which
translates to 150 VFR and 126 IFR peak hour operations. A fourth parallel
runway will increase the annual service volume to 654,893 operations, and
allow 157 VFR and 137 IFR operations during peak hour operations.
A second consideration to the runway location will be the cost
associated with its construction. In 1987 the second parallel was estimated
to carry a price tag of over $94 million, while the fourth parallel was expected
to cost $77 million (AvPlan). But according to Balotti these costs would
certainly have increased substantially since this study was completed.
Either runway would be paid for by Federal funds collected from the
purchase of every airline ticket. Justification for these expenditures must
still be made.
The third consideration will be the outcome of a study that is currently
underway by the FAA. Attention is being given to the possibihty of allowing

Alternative A

Figure 18. Alternate runway locations at PIT.

simultaneous triple parallel approaches. Balotti stated that the approval of
this operational method will increase the preference for a fourth parallel
even further.
Fourth, the location of a new runway will have an environmental
impact in terms of noise. The east side of PIT will be most affected by noise.
A fourth parallel will definitely impact developments currently under way on
the east side of the airport. Airport official have not ruled out the possibility
of purchasing additional real estate. According to PIT staff, noise mitigation
costs would be $9,700 per household for those under 75 LDN (noise level
indicator). Those households above 75 LDN would be purchased for $75,000
(these figures are subject to change). This action will be contingent on the
outcome of an environmental impact study.
As already mentioned, it is the consensus of the Planning Department
that a new runway will be built. The County will not wait until they have
attracted additional business to the airport, mainly because of the length of
time involved in the construction. Regardless of the location for this new
runway, the planning process will be quite protracted. According to Balotti,
once all of the environmental impact studies, engineering studies, planning,
and construction are done, five years will have elapsed (personal
communication, May 16, 1990).
As a result of the cost associated with planning and constructing a
runway, it is highly unlikely that PIT will opt to build two runways at the
same time. The Planning Department has taken the view that one
additional runway will hopefully sustain the airport for the next ten years.

Operational Delay

In an atmosphere of increasing demand and limited capacity, the
result will likely be increased delay times. This will result in increased costs
to the airlines. Delays result when flight times are over and above scheduled
operating times. The FAA criteria to calculate on-time performance defines a
delay based on the airlines ability to depart within fifteen minutes of its
scheduled departure time. An increase in delay time is caused by the
interaction with other aircraft competing for the same facilities and/or
airspace. But typically, as annual aircraft operations approach the ASV,
average delay per aircraft increases very rapidly. This will be the case in
1992.

Analysis of Economic Factors
Delays for air travel can be divided into two separate categories. The
first is the actual flight time between two specific points. The second is the
delay that occurs between the times the aircraft lands and the time it
reaches the gate. Any such delays should be of great concern to airline
operators. Not only will there be an economic cost associated with the delay,
but there will be sufficient loss of customer goodwill, which will affect future
business opportunities. Of these two types of delays, the later of the two will
be important to examine in PIT's case.
The true nature of the cost of a delay minute is difficult to quantify.
But the best available method is that which is used in the FAA's Airport
Capacity and Delay handbook, Advisor Circular 150/5060-5. This method
takes into consideration a host of variables that include peak hour demand,
runway configuration, taxiway layout, and distance which must be traveled.

At PIT there is a 52 second hold when crossing an active runway. An
indicator of the severity of the delay problem can be seen by looking at an
estimated average aircraft delay that can be expected in 1997 (base year
chosen for comparison). If the FAA's TAF forecast are accurate the level of
operations at that time will be 533,000. With no additional runway capacity,
there will be an average delay of 8.28 minutes, or approximately 73,554
annual delay hours (derived from the AvPlan study). Assuming an annual
inflation rate of 5.5 percent, this delay will cost the airlines approximately
$108.7 million in 1997 (assumes an average operating cost of $1,478 per
block hour).
Under the two main runway alternatives mentioned, there is a drastic
decrease in the average aircraft delay, and in the total annual cost. With a
second parallel crosswind runway, the average delay would only be 1.71
minutes, or 15,191 annual delay hours. The total cost to the airlines under
this configuration will only be $22.5 million. Finally, with the fourth parallel
runway, the average annual delay drops to 1.25 minutes, or 11,104 annual
delay hours. The annual delay cost to the airlines will be $16.4 million.

Effects for USAir
It is possible for much to change in a seven year period. However, the
position of USAir at PIT seems relatively stable. The fact that USAir has a
long term lease to operate at PIT virtually assures their strong presence at
PIT. PIT has emerged as USAir's main hub because it is the only airfield in
the eastern United States that has the ability to grow, is efficient, has low air
traffic density, and can reach any location with narrow body aircraft. For
that reason, the consequences of inadequate runway capacity become more
critical for its operation than any other party. But according to Frazier,

USAir does not know when the airfield will reach its capacity limit m terms
of runways. He does admit that there are periods in any day where the
demand for airport facilities reaches the capacity of the airfield.
The availability of runway capacity at PIT is critical to the financial
success of USAir. For example, without any expansion in capacity, USAir
stands to lose approximately $89.1 million because of their proportion of
flight activity. Under the second crosswind alternative USAir will lose
approximately $18.5 million annually. The final alternative of a fourth
parallel promises a loss of $13.5 million annually to USAir.
As already mentioned, it is difficult to place a dollar figure on the true
cost of an airline delay minute. According to Frazier it would be fairly
accurate to take the block hour cost, and divide by 60. According to
Quarterly Aircraft Operating Costs and Statistics. 3rd Quarter 1989, the
average operating cost of USAir's fleet was $1,722.25 per block hour, or
$28.70 per minute. The AvPlan study placed the value of a delay minute at
$24.63 per minute, but averaged all air carriers.
One of the major performance statistics, which indicate the
operational status of an airline, is the on-time performance record. Not only
are they used as a major marketing tool, but they also highlight areas of
inefficiency when they are examined on an individual airport basis.
Historically, the USAir system has shown a less than enviable record for ontime performance. However, PIT has not been the cause. According to the
United States Department of Transportation's Air Travel Consumer Reports
(1990, March), during the first quarter of 1990, PIT's on-time performance
rating was 80.1 percent. The national average is 75.3 percent. PIT has
traditionally ranked at the top in terms of on-time performance. According
to Frazier, PIT operates above average in terms of airport delays because of

the airfield configuration. The parallel approaches, which can operate down
to category 3 weather conditions, have been credited for this success. But as
traffic levels increase, delays may become an issue, not only to the operation
at PIT, but system wide.
As already mentioned, the FAA is currently establishing national
standards for triple approaches in low weather minimums, which will affect
PIT and the location of an additional runway. According to Frazier, USAir
will not back one runway location over another until the FAA completes its
study. At that time USAir will support the FAA findings. One of the major
concerns for USAir, when an additional runway is built, will be the capability
of the airspace infrastructure, and its ability to route aircraft to the runways.
According to Frazier, USAir has three options available in case no
runway is built. First, it could keep its volume of operations consistent with
the capacity of the airfield. This would be the best option for the airline.
Second, it could operate with the inefficiencies, which will result in delays
and congestion. And third, the block times for flights operating out of PIT
could be adjusted. This would be very costly and inefficient. Passengers
would be reluctant to fly USAir if they would have to spend 3 hours making a
flight that should have only taken two hours. The public will certainly voice
its displeasure, especially if nearly $.6 billion is spent on terminal
development.
The timing and accuracy of planning, not only for USAir, but for PIT
will become more crucial to continued growth. Toward this end, a good
working relationship between these two parties is essential. According to
Frazier, USAir does not have the relationship with other airports that it has
with PIT and Allegheny County. He feels the two are extremely
complementary in terms of working relationship.

As a result of the massive changes in facilities at PIT, a
complementary relationship will be essential. The absence of a coordinated
effort between USAir and PIT officials will only result in daily operational
delays, as well as long term facility deficiencies. These circumstances will
prove to be counterproductive for all concerns.

Chapter Seven
Conclusions and Recommendations

General Environment

As a result of our Society's dependence on convenience, speed, and
quality transportation, air travel has evolved from an alternative
transportation mode to one of necessity, with no logical substitute. Business
needs, emergencies, and limited vacation periods have all contributed to the
popularity of air travel. Innovation and technical achievement have also
contributed to activity growth with the development of aircraft capable of
transporting an increased number of passengers more efficiently. In
addition, the safety factor of air travel has been improved. Dependabihty in
engine construction and the protection of redundant aircraft systems has
virtually eliminated catastrophic mechanical failure. Consequently, the
number and frequency of consumers utihzing air transportation has
increased steadily, and will continue to do so for quite some time.
While the growth of the air transportation industry is not in itself
inherently problematic, it has created circumstances that must be overcome
if future growth is to continue unimpeded. The major issue that must be
addressed is the capacity of the national air transportation system to service
the demand for flight activity. Not only will it be important for the
commercial industry, but also for the civilian and military sectors that use
the same facilities.

The major barrier to unlimited growth is limited airport capacity.
Several decades ago, when our current airfield facilities were being built, the
upper limits of traffic volume were unknown. As a result, very httle thought
was given to the possibility of massive growth in this industry.
Consequently, landing facilities were constructed in close proximity to major
metropolitan areas. This limited the travel times from airfield to the
population center. It was also the area that would provide the best possible
pool of prospective customers.
As the nation continued to grow in population and prosperity, so did
the major cities. As a result of the close proximity of the airports, continued
growth in metropolitan areas completely engulfed the airfields. The ability
to expand in the future was extremely limited, and, in some cases, completely
out of the question.
There is, however, one exception to this phenomenon. PIT is the only
major airfield in the eastern United States that has the ability to expand (in
terms of additional runways). The airport planners should be commended
for their foresight. Not only did they locate the airport away from heavily
populated areas, but they also initiated a real estate purchasing program. It
was a safe policy to pursue. If expansion was required, adequate land would
be available; if not, the real estate would provide a buffered landing zone to
protect against noise complaints.
PIT also occupies an enviable position in terms of its geographic
location. Aircraft flying from PIT can reach any destination in the
continental U.S. with narrow body aircraft, which operate more efficiently.
Furthermore, the majority of air traffic occurs within 400 miles of PIT.
Airlines operating from PIT may be able to realize increased flight densities,
which will result in increased profitability.

Because of PIT's excellent position in relation to the industry, both
passenger and operations forecasts call for massive increases throughout the
next 15 years. The FAA predicts the volume of operations at PIT to double in
the next five years alone. Whatever the reasoning behind the popularity of
PIT, the basic facts remain the same; PIT's ability to expand and its
geographic location in relation to the eastern half of the United States make
it one of the major locations for future air traffic growth.

Operational Limitations At PIT

USAir has recognized the benefits of operating from PIT. Since the
Deregulation Act of 1978, USAir has consistently increased both its size and
market position. PIT has been USAir's (Allegheny's) major base for quite
some time. But because of the proliferation of the hub and spoke system, as
a direct result of deregulation, PIT had rapidly become USAir's major hub.
There is virtually no chance that these circumstances will change in
the near term. First, USAir has signed a long term lease with the County of
Allegheny, holding the airline partially responsible for the cost of current
facility improvements. Second, as already mentioned, there are no other
airfields in the eastern United States capable of sustaining substantial
increases in flight activity. Furthermore, no additional landing facilities are
under construction in the eastern half of the country. As a result, USAir
activity at PIT in the future is virtually assured. Currently, USAir
operations account for over 80 percent of aircraft movements at PIT. Any
barriers to smooth and timely operations will have a tremendous economic
impact for USAir. Two elements must be balanced if adequate and cost
efficient operations are to be sustained. They are the terminal constraints

and runway constraints.

Terminal Constraint
As a result of PIT's enviable position in terms of expansion, planners
must make every effort to forecast the nature of the environment in the
future and assure that adequate facihties are available to handle the
demand. Until now, the limitations of PIT have been blamed on the
limitations of the terminal. Growth in passenger traffic has finally increased
to the point were planners cannot ignore the need for additional terminal
facihties. It is believed that growth in USAir operations has been the
catalyst. Related to that has been the national growth of air transportation
as a result of deregulation. Third, it is believed that planners finally
recognized the lack of alternative landing facilities in the eastern U.S.
As a means of addressing the terminal capacity problem at PIT, the
Midfield Terminal project has been initiated. One must recognize a critical
reality: with the increased size and efficiency of Midfield Terminal,
immediate increases in demand to use PIT will arise. The airlines would not
have assumed the costs of additional gates if they had no intention of using
them. In addition, the airlines will not simply redistribute their current
traffic. There would be no need to increase the number of gates when the
current configuration is adequate. The limiting factor of PIT will now shift
from one of terminal constraints to runway limitations.

Runway Constraint
The issue of calculating an airport's runway capacity, like most issues,
has at least two viewpoints. First, there are those that contend that an
airport's runway capacity should be measured according to the true capacity
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of the runway. In other words, a runway's limitation should be its hourly
capacity, as established by the FAA, multiplied by 24 to arrive at the ASV.
Utilizing this method of calculating runway capacity for planning purposes
assures maximum possible use of the runways. It also assumes that true
demand will be equally distributed throughout the day, month, and year.
The opposing viewpoint contends that runway capacity should be
measured according to the peak operating times of that particular airport.
As would be expected, the demand to use air transportation is not stable.
Factors that play a key role in the level of activity include the season of the
year, time of day, destination, and the type of travel. As a result, fluctuations
in activity occur. Those who profess peak hour runway capacity calculations
recognize these fluctuations as a basis for planning.
Each viewpoint has its benefits and drawbacks. First, planning
according to ASV will be very impractical because it assumes the demand to
use the runways will be equally distributed throughout a 24 hour day. If a
commercial air carrier were to adjust its schedule to allow for operations at
an airport using ASV criteria, its load factor would quickly drop, causing
inefficient conditions. Ultimately, the airline will fail to cover its costs and
cease to operate. The only possible way for this method to function efficiently
would be for compulsory participation at all airports by all airlines. This
would effectively eliminate any competitive advantage one airline may
obtain.
The major drawback for planning according to peak hour capacity will
be an inefficient use of runway capacity during off peak times. The
construction costs for a modern day runway are not small. It seems rather
foolish to devote massive resources to a facility that may only be used for one
or two hours a day.

This study attempted to temper these two viewpoints by taking into
consideration aspects of both. By using the average day in the peak month,
stable and consistent traffic demand was identified. But, because of the
commercial nature of air travel, peak hour operations could not be
overlooked. The nature of the hub and spoke system depends on flights
arriving and departing within a short period of time. This characteristic is
too vital to competitive operation to compromise.

Preemptive Actions

As a result of the ever increasing need for lead time in planning and
constructing modern facilities, accurate and timely forecasts of future
activity should be essential. While officials at PIT have made every effort to
forecast items related to the construction of Midfield Terminal, they failed to
examine the effects on the runway capacity. They recognized the need to
examine runway capacity, but not as an integral part of airport development.
Central to any project must be its effects on related areas. In 1992, PIT will
face circumstances that will certainly cause an imbalance between the
demand to use terminal facilities and the capacity of the current runway
configuration. There are several methods available to address this problem
at PIT. If future operations growth is to continue unimpeded, immediate
attention must be focused on eliminating the barrier posed by runway
capacity. This can be done two ways: through additional runways or through
regulatory measures for better utilization of current facilities.

Additional Capacity
The new Midfield Terminal will increase gate space by 42 percent

when it opens in late 1992. USAir on the other hand will realize an increase
in its gate space by 61 percent. Inherent in these increases will be an
increase in flight operations. The increase in operations is verified by the
AvPlan study, Peat Marwick study, Airport Master Plan, and the FAA. While
these sources disagree on the timing and volume of the increases, the
consensus is that operations will increase substantially in the future.
It is the researcher's contention that these increases will occur in
1992-93. At that time the current runway configuration will be incapable of
accommodating the demand. The result will be protracted delays, both on
the ground and in the air. Furthermore, operational inefficiencies will result
in crew compensation, fuel consumption, and loss of customer goodwill
(because of delays). Because of USAir's dominance at PIT, it stands to lose
the most in absolute terms from these inefficiencies. In an extremely
competitive environment, such an event may cause irreparable damage to
USAir.
There is only one major alternative available to avoid an imbalance
between terminal facilities and runway capacity at PIT build an additional
runway. Most parties concerned with the operation of PIT agree that an
additional runway will be needed. Dissension arises as to when this runway
should be built. USAir faces great costs in terms of operational costs and
competitive position if the runway is not built. Airport officials, on the other
hand, are faced with justifying additional expenditures of public funds.
The past history of the airport planning function is riddled with delay
after delay. If PIT is to take advantage of its enviable position, this same
approach must be avoided at all costs. Accurate and rapid decisions must be
made where the new runway is concerned. The major question facing airport
officials now is the location of the new runway. It is believed that the FAA

will eventually give its stamp of approval to triple parallel approaches.
Because this configuration will allow the greatest increase in peak hour
operations (of the runway alternatives discussed), it should be selected as the
primary location. Environmental and engineering studies should be initiated
immediately to avoid any further delay.

Regulatory Solution
The debate over Government involvement in private affairs sparks
passionate responses. There are examples of regulation being the reason for
increased costs and decreased competition. There have been just as many
instances of rampant abuse and wastefulness without regulation. Where
vital services are concerned, the Government has a responsibility to assure
that all citizens have direct access to these services. Air transportation is
one such industry.
When the Deregulation Act of 1978 went into effect, air carriers
suddenly had the freedom to pick and choose their markets with little
interference. Unprofitable routes were dropped and money makers were
picked up. Competition brought about better service and reduced fares
(although some may argue this point). But the major result of deregulation
was the emergence of the hub airport, which can indirectly be blamed for the
dramatic increase in operations at PIT.
In an effort to resolve the congestion of hub airports, and ultimately
the problem of an imbalance of facilities and runway capacity at PIT,
Government re-regulation may be a viable alternative. Although, a
regression back to the circumstances of the 1970's is highly unlikely, a
version of re-regulation may have merit, especially at major congested hubs.
There have already been congressional hearings into just such a proposal.
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Re-regulation may present itself in the form of limiting domination of a hub
by a single air carrier. It may also come in the form of controlled allocation of
landing slots to reduce congestion and delay. Whatever form re-regulation
may take, it should be viewed as a possible solution to the congestion
problems. Further study must be accomplished prior to any substantive
statements as to its usefulness.

Further Research Required

As a result of the many variables involved in analyzing the
circumstances at PIT, additional research into related areas must be
initiated to fully understand the future. The first concern is the capability of
the ATC system. Our ATC system has fallen behind the rest of the aviation
industry in terms of technological advancement. Front line equipment is, in
some cases, over twenty years old. The number of controllers has remained
relatively static, with no plans to drastically increase their numbers.
Increased workloads have placed a strain on the controllers themselves, as
well as the safety factor of air travel.
Regardless of the size and capacity of the terminal, or the number and
capacity of runways, the ATC system must be capable of routing aircraft to
the airfield in a timely manner. Additional research must be conducted to
ascertain the ATC systems ability to accomplish this task. Efforts must be
made to identify what additional equipment and/or controllers will be needed
to accommodate future operations at PIT.
The second area for further research involves the practicality of the
hub traffic system. Ever since deregulation, the volume of air traffic has
increased dramatically. Because of the freedom to enter and exit markets at
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will, the airlines have adopted the hub traffic system. Further study into the
benefits and drawbacks of the hub system must be initiated. Attention must
be paid to issues of safety, efficiency, and operating limitations at those
airports where the hub is in operation. If an alternative method of
accommodating aircraft demand is found, the current expansion in terminal
and runway capacity at PIT may be unnecessary.
The third area in which further study is needed revolves around the
method of airport capacity calculations. The major statistics used to assess
the capacity of an airfield have been the peak hour method and the ASV.
These two methods lie on opposing ends of a continuum. Research must be
conducted to establish an alternative method of calculating capacity; one that
takes into consideration the important points of both the peak hour and ASV
methods.
Fourth, there is a tendency for all major airports to utilize aviation
consulting firms. Considering the volume of money involved and the impact
airport facilities have on the surrounding community, it is easy to
understand the need for additional information. But there may be a
tendency for consulting firms to erroneously suggest expansion when it is not
necessary. There is some evidence their suggestions may be self serving.
Further study must be initiated to identify the consulting firms' methodology
and the manner in which airport planners utilize their suggestions.
Fifth, as a result of the development at PIT, many forecasts have
predicted a substantial increase in economic development near the airport.
It is not known whether this increase will be tied directly to the success of
PIT. If so, the absence of projected growth at PIT may have an adverse effect
on the economic future of the area. Furthermore, the conditions of both PIT
and USAir must be analyzed to project the impact on their respective
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organizations if the growth does not materialize. What will become of the
massive investment in new facilities?
The sixth area that warrants additional research concerns the
forecasting method. As a result of the amount of money and time involved
many organizations rely on forecasts to make decisions. The FAA is the main
agency which is responsible for forecasting air traffic. Historically, these
forecasts have been somewhat less than accurate. The development of more
accurate forecasting techniques must be addressed.
And finally, as the volume of aircraft operations increases, various
other methods to accommodate this traffic must be explored. If the growth in
operations can be traced to increasing frequency on existing flights,
increasing the size of the aircraft may substantially reduce the number of
operations. Formal research into this possibility may reduce the chance of
unnecessary expansion, and reduce overcrowded air space.

Future Outlook

The future prospects for PIT appear to be extremely bright. Not only
will the airport expansion result in modern and efficient operations, but it
will also serve as the basis for economic prosperity for the surrounding
communities and Allegheny County. New roads to service the airport have
already opened vast tracts of land for commercial development. Pittsburgh
will also be able to reap the benefits through greater national attention and
exposure.
USAir's future appears to be just as bright. The growth in air
transportation will not reach its pinnacle for some time. USAir has a strong
foundation to expand its operations and take advantage of the opportunities
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directly related to the new Midfield Terminal.
The success and well being of both PIT and USAir depend on how well
officials recognize and react to the obvious shortcoming in terms of runway
capacity. Considering the time involved to remedy this problem, immediate
attention must be given to this issue. At the very least, additional studies
must be initiated to further explore future operational conditions.
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